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CASE NOTES
Criminal Law-Entrapment in the Federal Courts-Subjective Test Re-
affirmed Against Lower Court Departures.-In December 1969, an undercover
agent for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, who sought to
locate a methamphetamine ("speed") factory, represented himself to respondent
and his two co-defendants as the agent of a criminal syndicate. In return for
his offer to supply the defendants with phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P), an essential,
but scarce, ingredient of speed, defendants were to supply the agent with one-
half their future production. Two days later, the agent returned with 100 grams
of P-2-P, which defendants at once used to manufacture two batches of speed.
The agent, who observed the process without participation, was given one batch
and purchased part of the other for $60. A month later the agent asked one of
the co-defendants if he was still interested in the arrangement. This defendant
responded affirmatively but added that it would take a few days to finish with
two bottles of P-2-P which he had acquired elsewhere. No evidence was
adduced linking respondent with this or any phase of his co-defendants'
operation other than the original transaction. Three days later the agent
returned with a search warrant and halted the illegal operation. Respondent's
conviction was reversed by the court of appeals which held that he had been
entrapped.' Upon certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding as a matter
of law that respondent had not been entrapped. United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973).
It is demonstrable that the doctrine of entrapment is an indirect result of
society's desire to regulate the habits of its members, to which end it creates
sumptuary2 offenses. These offenses are difficult of detection since generally
they are committed in private, and are normally consensual in the sense that
there is rarely a complaining victim to present the matter to the police. In-
deed, the police often operate without the sympathy of the public in detecting
these "victimless" crimes. The police thus are forced to develop less con-
ventional detection techniques,3 often in situations where pressures of time and
place4 require instant decisions by individuals with differing attitudes towards
both methodology and suspect. 5 These detection tactics, however factually
disparate, are elementally similar. One analysis of the typical situation involves
1. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
2. The term's modem usage encompasses regulation or proscription of narcotics, alco-
holic beverages, prostitution, and other such habits offensive to the general welfare. See,
e.g., Bancroft, Administration of the Affirmative Trap and the Doctrine of Entrapment:
Device and Defense, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 137, 137-38 & n.2 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Bancroft].
3. Id. at 138-40; Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and
Agent Provocateurs, 60 Yale L.J. 1091, 1093-94 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Donnelly].
4. Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 Va. L. Rev. 871,
875-77 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Rotenberg].
5. Bancroft 149-58.
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the police agent "(1) acting in the capacity of a victim, (2) intending by his
actions to suggest his willingness to be a victim, (3) actually communicating
this feigned willingness to the suspect, and (4) thereby having some influence
upon his commission of the crime."'6 This elemental pattern may be termed "en-
couragement, ' 7 whereby the police by artifice deploy to observe a course of
secret, consensual, otherwise undetectable crime, and to obtain evidence sufficient
to arrest and convict the suspect. In view of the many variables involved, it is
not suprising that, in their desire to trigger an observable offense (by one
supposedly ready, willing, and able to commit such an offense), the police
occasionally have resorted to overzealous methods. Often, this can result in a
patently different situation, involving "the conception and planning of an
offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would
not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the
officer."8 At this point the judicial limitation on police methods known as the
doctrine of entrapment interposes itself.
The doctrine is indigenous to the United States,9 and first appears in the
state courts in the late 1870s.10 Although the doctrine was not recognized in
the federal courts until 1915,11 the following two decades saw a wave of
federal entrapment claims.12 To the extent an analysis was attempted, justifica-
tion of the doctrine generally was based on one of two grounds. One rationale
was that public policy could not condone the punishment of a man for a crime
incited by the government.13 Other courts reasoned that the government was
estopped from prosecuting by its agents' conduct.1 4 Similar disagreement
6. Rotenberg 874 (footnotes omitted). There is not a victim in the true sense, for the
sumptuary victim participates voluntarily. Rather, be is the medium through which the
crime impacts on society, the ultimate victim. Id. n.10.
7. Id. at 874.
8. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring) (em-
phasis added). Justice Roberts's definition has achieved wide acceptance as the classic
definition of entrapment. See, e.g., 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 45(2) (1961).
9. English courts have refused to recognize entrapment as a defense. DeFeo, Entrap-
ment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory and Application, 1 U.
San. Fran. L. Rev. 243, 245-47 (1967) [hereinafter cited as DeFeo]. But cf. Brannan v.
Peek, [1947J 2 All E.R. 572, 573-74 (K.B.) (dictum).
10. The earliest cases are collected in Annot., 25 L.R.A. 341 (1894).
11. Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
12. See cases collected in Annot., 86 A.L.R. 263 (1933); Annot., 66 AL.R. 478 (1930);
Annot., 18 A.L.L 146 (1922).
13. E.g., Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921); Sam Yick v. United
States, 240 F. 60, 67 (9th Cir. 1917); United States v. Echols, 253 F. 862, 863 (S.D. Tex.
1918).
14. E.g., United States v. Kaiser, 138 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
801 (1944); Voves v. United States, 249 F. 191 (7th Cir. 1918); United States v. Lynch,
256 F. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). These decisions proceeded despite the common law rule
that the sovereign cannot be estopped. At least one commentator, however, has concluded
that the no-estoppel rule is weakening dramatically. Comment, Applying Estoppel Prin-
ciples in Criminal Cases, 78 Yale LJ. 1046 (1969).
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existed as to what police conduct would constitute entrapment.1 In retrospect,
it is apparent that the Supreme Court made a significant contribution to the
confusion by refusing to analyze the doctrine until 1932.1
At that point, however, in the landmark case of Sorrells v. United States,"7
the Court resolved these matters in an opinion which, as supplemented by the
decision in Sherman v. United States,'$ had expressed the fundamental law
of entrapment in the federal courts until the instant case. The facts of these
two cases are examples both of the normal context in which encouragement
techniques are used, and of the evils to which such methods descend and
against which the entrapment doctrine sets its face. In Sorrells, an undercover
prohibition agent, posing as a visitor in town, engaged petitioner in warm
conversation, centered around their shared wartime experiences. During this
conversation, the agent repeatedly asked Sorrells to "get him some liquor."
After twice refusing, Sorrells finally stepped out and returned with liquor, which
he then sold to the agent. For this offense, Sorrells was convicted. 1'
The facts of Sherman were even less savory. There, the acquaintance be-
tween petitioner and a paid government informer grew through several chance
meetings at a doctor's office, where both were being treated for narcotics
addiction. On several such occasions the informer asked Sherman if he knew
a source of narcotics, since the informer was not responding to treatment and
was suffering greatly. At last petitioner acquiesced and purchased a quantity
15. Some cases turned on the "genesis of intent": the question was whether the de-
fendant had entertained the "intent" to commit the crime before the agent approached
him, or whether the agent had implanted the intent. E.g., Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35
(8th Cir. 1921); Peterson v. United States, 255 F. 433 (9th Cir. 1921); Sam Yick v.
United States, 240 F. 60 (9th Cir. 1917). Other courts concluded that "[ijf the officers of
the government act in good faith and in the honest belief that the defendant Is engaged In
an unlawful business . . . the defense of entrapment is without merit." E.g., United States
v. Reisenweber, 288 F. 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1923); see Billingsley v. United States, 274 F. 86
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 656 (1921); United States v. Certain Quantities of In-
toxicating Liquors, 290 F. 824 (D.N.H. 1921). One case, involving the use of a Caucasian-
appearing Indian as an undercover agent to induce sales of liquor from defendants, in vio-
lation of laws prohibiting the sale of liquor to Indians, simply held that this deception
constituted entrapment per se. United States v. Healy, 202 F. 349 (D. Mont. 1913).
16. In the federal courts recognition of the entrapment doctrine had been pressed in
the late 19th century, but had become confused in a series of cases involving non-mallable
matter posted in response to imaginative decoy letters sent by government agents. Uni-
formly, these cases were decided on an ad hoc basis without explicit mention of an entrap-
ment doctrine. E.g., United States v. Adams, 59 F. 674, 676-77 (D. Ore. 1894); United
States v. Grimm, 50 F. 528 (ED. Mo. 1892), aff'd, 156 U.S. 604 (1895); United States v.
Whittier, 28 F. Cas. 591, 594 (No. 16,688) (ED. Mo. 1878) (Treat, J., concurring). Some
of the decoy letter cases reached the Supreme Court, which held merely that the use of
decoy letters by the police was permissible as a matter of law. What constituted imper-
missible inducement, and why, was not discussed. Goode v. United States, 159 U.S. 663
(1895); Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604 (1895).
17. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
18. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
19. 287 U.S. at 438-40.
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of narcotics, part of which he sold to the informer; the remainder facilitated
his own relapse into addiction. After several such transactions, the informer
tipped off government agents. 20
In reversing Sorrells's conviction, the Supreme Court expressed grave mis-
givings about the power of the judiciary to prevent, on the basis of public policy
or estoppel, the punishment of acts denominated as criminal by Congress. This
would be tantamount, said the Court, to clemency, which is a function of the
executive branch and, hence, beyond the power of a courL2' Rather, continued
the Court, entrapment deals with an individual who has not violated the
penal statute, for Congress could not have intended its statute to be enforced
by methods which lure into commission of the proscribed acts one who, but for
those methods, would not so have acted.-2 2 Statutory construction, then, was
the proper theoretical wellspring of the doctrine, and the assumed "innocence-
but-for" of its beneficiary was the key to all cases. A defendant is otherwise
innocent, said the Court, when the criminal design is conceived by the govern-
ment's agents, who then induce the defendant to commit criminal acts not of
his conception.23 The controlling question, then, is what is styled the "genesis
of intent.124 Thus, continued the Court, to the claim of inducement the govern-
ment may respond with "an appropriate and searching inquiry " 25 into de-
fendant's predisposition, by evidence of the defendant's past criminal designs,
which tends to show that he is not, after all, otherwise innocent. -0 Applying
this test, the Court had little difficulty in concluding that Sorrells was, indeed,
otherwise innocent2
That Sherman was equally innocent was the conclusion of a unanimous
Court in Sherman v. United States,28 but in strict adherence to Sorrdls, the
majority opinion spoke for only five justices.2 9 The Court declined to reconsider
the Sorrells rationale without benefit of briefs or oral argument. 30 In view of
20. 356 U.S. at 371. Resort to paid informers, instead of police undercover agents, is
perhaps the least wholesome aspect of these detection practices. It has been estimated that
90 percent of narcotics sales come to light through informers. Rotenberg 875 n.15. Judicial
attempts to provide protection against unscrupulous informers, while preserving the gov-
ernment's interest in the secrecy of its informers' identity and methods, have had curious
effects on defendants' right to confront their accusers, i.e., the informers. Donnelly 1094-96.
Egregious abuses of the use of informers have occasioned wrathful denunciations from the
bench. E.g., Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 950 (1965) (informer paid, on contingency basis, so much for each suspect produced).
21. 287 U.S. at 449-50. For a fuller discussion of the entrapment doctrine as beyond
the power of the judiciary see notes 53 & 54 infra and accompanying text.
22. 287 U.S. at 446-48.
23. Id. at 445.
24. Donnelly 1104; see 287 U.S. at 442; note 15 supra.
25. 287 U.S. at 451.
26. Id. at 451-52.
27. Id. at 452.
28. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
29. Justices Frankfurter, Brennan, Douglas and Harlan concurred in the result only.
30. 356 U.S. at 376.
1973]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the "handicaps" that would be placed on the police, were evidence of de-
fendant's criminal history excluded,3 ' the Court did not wish to be "brushing
aside the possibility that we would be creating more problems than we would
supposedly be solving."'3 2
The problems which Sherman refrained from "supposedly solving" are real
enough, as revealed in the concurring opinions of Justice Roberts in Sorrells8
and Justice Frankfurter in Sherman,3 4 which have served as the spearheads for
a continual attack upon the Sorrells-Sherman thesis. The resort to statutory
construction as the legal theory behind the entrapment doctrine presents grave
difficulties, for there is no evidence that Congress intended what the Court
says it intended. Indeed, the fair meaning of the statutes involved is the exact
opposite of the Court's interpretation.35 What the Court effectively has done
is to amend the statute so as to exempt from its sanction not only those who
have not committed the proscribed acts, but also some of those who have done
so.86 Moreover, since the Court has refused to construe sumptuary offenses
as requiring proof of scienter,37 it is inconsistent to exculpate some of those
who do act with scienter. But assuming arguendo the correctness of this in-
terpretation put on the legislation involved in Sorrells, nothing inherent in
the Court's logic commands an identical construction of other sumptuary laws. 8
Ostensibly this is an issue raised for decision in every case. Yet no case found
since Sorrells has attempted such an analysis,89 and there are strong hints in
Sherman that the issue is closed, irrespective of the nature of the statute.40
Moreover, the genesis of intent test is fraught with inconsistencies. The
31. Id. at 377.
32. Id. at 377-78. It appears that Sherman made no alteration in the rule of Sorrells,
which generally has been read for the proposition that if defendant can show that he was
"otherwise innocent," and induced in fact by the police conduct, no further inquiry into
the nature of that conduct is required to establish entrapment. At least one commentator,
however, has pointed out the possibility of reading Sherman to say that defendant must
show not only that he is "otherwise innocent," but also that the police methods employed
against him fell below a certain objective norm. There is allegedly nothing in Sorrdlls itself
to contravene this interpretation. Rotenberg 895-96 & nn.86-87. In view of the unitary
focus of the subjective theory of entrapment upon defendant's predisposition, this inter-
pretation seems debatable. The instant case may have settled the point by emphasizing
anew the sole focus upon predisposition. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433-36
(1973).
33. 287 U.S. at 453-59 (Roberts, J., concurring).
34. 356 U.S. at 378-85 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 379-80 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
36. 287 U.S. at 456 (Roberts, J., concurring).
37. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
38. 287 U.S. at 450-51; see Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts,
90 U. Pa. L. Rev. 245, 255-56 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Mikell].
39. DeFeo 256-57; Dornelly 1110; Mikell 259.
40. "Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempt-
ing innocent persons into violations." 356 U.S. at 372; cf. United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 433-35 (1973).
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entrapment doctrine by definition concerns itself with the impermissibility of
some police detection practices. If the question is which practices, it is plainly
unresponsive to answer with an inquiry into the state of mind of the victim
of the police conduct in issue. The result of that inquiry would be the same if
the entrapper were a private citizen, yet it is settled that in such a case there
is no defense.4 ' And when the courts speak of genesis of intent, they cannot
mean pure intent to the specific crime charged, for even an entrapped de-
fendant intends the acts for which he is indicted. The courts can be referring
only to a general, pre-existent disposition to violate the law; attempts to defend
the test as a psychiatrically valid distinction between "chronic" and "situa-
tional" offenders certainly have assumed as much.4 2 This suggests a more
fundamental problem: in finding that the defendant harbored a general
criminal predisposition, on the basis of evidence of his prior criminal behavior,
the courts are convicting the defendant for offenses for which he is not being
tried. For these offenses, the chronic offender apparently could not be con-
victed directly, for if the police had possessed sufficient evidence thereof, there
would have been no need to induce defendant into another offense. 3
These conceptual difficulties with genesis of intent create inequitable practical
consequences. The government's evidence rebutting a claim of entrapment
consists largely of hearsay evidence concerning defendant's prior crimes and
convictions which is admissible for the sole purpose of proving defendant's
predisposition. It is dubious whether this highly prejudicial evidence will not
affect the jury's determination of the separate issue of defendant's com-
mission of the crime charged.4 4 The problems do not vanish if the jury
succeeds in accomplishing this feat. Consider two defendants, A and B. They
have committed the identical crime in circumstances of an identical level of
police inducement. The only difference in their cases, in fact, is that A has
a history of similar criminal activity and B has none. A, whose entrapment
defense is rebutted, will be convicted; B will go free. The practical effect is
that the level of permissible police inducement is directly proportional to the
length of the suspect's record and to the number of his enemies.45 It would
seem that the genesis of intent doctrine allows the police to induce former
convicts back into crime more freely than they may lure a law-abiding citizen.
Thus, once convicted, a man is charged with the legal duty, under pain of
another conviction, to resist greater police inducement than must the law-
abiding man.
No doubt largely due to these shortcomings in the "subjective" theory of
41. United States v. Romano, 278 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1960); Polski v. United States, 33
F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 591 (1929) ; see Note, Entrapment: An Analysis
of Disagreement, 45 B.U.L. Rev. 542, 560-65 (1965).
42. Donnelly 1107-08, 1113-14; Mikell 250-52; Rotenberg 897-99.
43. 287 U.S. at 458-59 (Roberts, J., concurring); Donnelly 1107-03; see Mrikell 2.Sl
44. 287 U.S. at 458 (Roberts, J., concurring); Bancroft 177-78; Donnelly 110s. Good
discussions of the particulars of the admissibility rule are found in DeFeo 263-67; Note,
Entrapment: An Analysis of Disagreement, 45 B.U.L. Rev. 542, 555-56 (1965).
45. 356 U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ; Bancroft 170.
19731
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the entrapment doctrine, a vastly different "objective" theory has emerged,
showing remarkable resiliency in the face of two rejections by the Supreme
Court. Its main tenets have been delineated in a dissent by Justice Brandeis in
Casey v. United States,46 in Justice Roberts's concurring opinion in Sorrells,47
and in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sherman.48
Casey involved a conviction for an illegal purchase of narcotics under a
statute making evidence of an illegal sale prima facie evidence of an illegal
purchase. The facts surrounding the sale itself clearly warranted discussion of
possible entrapment, but the Court limited itself to considering and upholding
the validity of the evidentiary presumption. 49 Justice Brandeis, however, dis-
sented on the basis of entrapment. He conceded that the conduct of the govern-
ment did not operate to exculpate a defendant guilty of the crime charged,
but he argued nonetheless that defendant's unexculpated guilt was irrelevant:
This prosecution should be stopped, not because some right of Casey's has been
denied, but in order to protect the Government. To protect it from illegal conduct
of its officers. To preserve the purity of its courts.50
In the same vein was Justice Roberts's opinion in Sorrells. A fundamental
rule of public policy, he declared, made it "the province of the court and of the
court alone to protect itself and the government from such prostitution of the
criminal law."'r The emphasis, according to this analysis, upon the nature of
governmental activity rendered irrelevant defendant's state of mind. Pre-
disposition, Justice Roberts declared, was a "false issue," for to say that
impermissible governmental conduct was "rendered innocuous" by defendant's
criminal reputation is to disregard the policy reasons why the courts refuse
their processes to the government in entrapment situations. 2
Whatever the merits of Justice Roberts's objective theory in laundering
the entrapment doctrine of the practical difficulties and inequities attending
the subjective approach, it nonetheless suffers from a fundamental problem
with its public policy underpinnings. A strong case can be made for the
proposition that, in releasing concededly guilty defendants on public policy
grounds, the courts usurp powers reserved to the other two coordinate branches.
In Sorrells, the Court proceeded on the premise that the law of the criminal
case, unlike civil actions, is contained solely in the apposite statute, and that
if that statute labels defendant guilty, his only plea is the statute's uncon-
stitutionality. To release a defendant guilty under a constitutional statute is to
grant clemency, a function of the executive. 3 By similar reasoning, Professor
46. 276 U.S. 413, 421-25 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
47. 287 U.S. at 453-59 (Roberts, J., concurring).
48. 356 U.S. at 378-85 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
49. 276 U.S. at 418-20.
50. Id. at 425 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
51. 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring).
53. 287 U.S. at 449-50. The Court relied on Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916),
which held that there is no power in the courts to suspend indefinitely a congressionally
[Vol. 42
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Mikell has perceived in the objective theory an intrusion upon congressional
powers as well. Congress, argues Mikell, has already determined public policy
by choosing to outlaw defendant's very acts. In refusing to punish upon policy
grounds, the courts are operating on the theory that Congress is either
ignorant of, or in violation of, "true" public policy. This, the argument con-
dudes, constitutes an appropriation of congressional powers, since judicial
power in this area is limited to disposing of what is unconstitutional."
It is perhaps for these reasons that Justice Frankfurter in Sherman chose to
rework the objective theory's doctrinal basis, by grounding the entrapment
doctrine not on public policy, but on the supervisory powers of the federal
courts to formulate and apply standards for the enforcement of the federal
criminal law.55 It is not enough, Justice Frankfurter contended, to say that a
criminal may not be set free for reasons extraneous to a constitutional statute,
for statutes are enacted under certain presuppositions concerning the legal
order, one of which is the established supervisory role of the federal courts. 6
What the federal courts already possess, they cannot usurp.
In addition to shifting the theoretical basis of entrapment, Justice Frank-
furter also set forth a test for determining what police conduct was impermis-
sible:
[I]n holding out inducements they [the police] should act in such a manner as is
likely to induce to the commission of crime only these persons [those ready and
willing to commit further crimes should the occasion arise] and not others who
would normally avoid crime and through self-struggle resist ordinary tempta-
tions. This test shifts attention from the record and predisposition of the particular
defendant to the conduct of the police and the likelihood, objectively considered,
that it would entrap only those ready and willing to commit crime.57
The objective theory, particularly in the variant form evolved by Justice
Frankfurter, has shown great resiliency in the lower courts, despite Sherman's
affirmation of the subjective theory. Several lower courts, sometimes making
much of the "fact" that Sherman had not "expressly" disapproved the objec-
tive theory, applied it, in the alternative, alongside the subjective theory.58
mandated sentence during the good behavior of the defendant, and which said in part: "[It
would be in] disregard of the Constitution (to hold that] the plain legislative command
fixing a specific punishment... is subject to be permanently set aside by an implied
judicial power upon considerations extraneous to the legality of the conviction, [for] it
would seem necessarily to follow that there could be likewise implied a discretionary au-
thority to permanently refuse to try a criminal charge because of the conclusion that a
particular act made criminal by law ought not to be treated as criminal." Id. at 42.
54. M kell 260-63; cf. Ex parte United States, 242 U.s. 27, 42 (1916).
55. 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 381 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
58. E.g., Morrison v. United States, 348 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905
(1965) ; Accardi v. United States, 257 Fad 168 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 883 (1958) ;
United States v. Kros, 296 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 1969); United States v. Dillet 265 F.
Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72 (Ist Cir.), cert.
1973]
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Other courts spoke in terms of "supervisory powers" or expressed extreme
discomfort with the present state of the law." Still other courts dutifully recited
the subjective formula, and then reversed convictions on facts leaving little
doubt as to defendant's obvious "predisposition."00 These three lines of
thought constituted a pull at the tether of Sherman but did not depart from it.
Quite distinct from these were two lines of cases which emerged by 1972
and which constituted grimly defiant departures from the subjective theory.
The first of these involved unusual fact patterns wherein the contraband serv-
ing as the basis of defendant's prosecution under the appropriate contraband
statute was supplied by the government."' In none of these cases was there
much doubt as to defendant's predisposition, yet in each case the pattern was
held to constitute entrapment. The second series of cases found entrapment by
an intense degree of governmental participation in the crime, although all
defendants concededly were predisposed. 2 One such case, Greene v. United
States, 3 held that, even though there was no entrapment under the Sherman
analysis, reversal was nonetheless in order when the governmental activity
was so intense, so pervasive, and of such duration as to become "repugnant
to American criminal justice."'64
At this juncture the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered
United States v. Russell,"5 the facts of which suggested both of the afore-
mentioned caselines. Noting that defendant had conceded his predisposition,60
the court nonetheless concluded that apart from the rule of Sherman, a defense
to a criminal charge could be founded on an "intolerable degree of govern-
mental participation. ' 67 Authority for this conclusion was found by relying
squarely on both the contraband cases and the Greene line, which, the court
asserted, differed in label only-both being grounded in "fundamental con-
denied, 375 U.S. 884 (1963) ; cf. United States v. Abbadessa, 470 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Tatar, 439 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971). But cf.
Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967).
59. E.g., Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Robison v.
United States, 379 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1967), vacated, 390 U.S. 198 (1968); see Smith v.
United States, 331 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (en banc).
60. E.g., Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1968); Henderson
v. United States, 261 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Campbell, 235 F. Supp.
190 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
61. United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated mem., 412 U.S.
936 (1973); United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 949 (1973); United States v. Mahoney, 355 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. La. 1973); United
States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
62. Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971); Williamson v. United States,
311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965); United States v. Silva,
180 F. Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
63. 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
64. Id. at 787.
65. 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
66. Id. at 672.
67. Id. at 673.
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cepts of due process," 68 and both compelling reversal of Russell's conviction.
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision,69 reversed the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit, and reasserted the subjective theory. At the outset, the Court
rejected the argument, advanced by the court of appeals, 70 that the govern-
ment's conduct violated due process, for no independent right of Russell's had
been violated, nor had the government's methods contravened its own laws.7
Thus, any analogy to the exclusion of evidence obtained by illegal searches
and coerced confessions was faulty.72 The Court conceded, however, that the
conduct of law enforcement agents, on other facts, might be so outrageous as
to contravene due process.73
The Court then turned to Russell's non-constitutional contentions. Noting
that criticisms of the subjective theory were "not devoid of appeal,'14 the
Court nonetheless delivered a recitation of the difficulties which enforcement
authorities would face if they were forbidden to rebut entrapment claims with
a recital of defendant's past misdeeds. 75 In any event, the Court noted, so long
as entrapment did not assume constitutional dimensions, Congress could over-
rule Sorrells legislatively any time it pleased.78 In fact, the Court mentioned,
but did not discuss, one proposed statutory formulation of the entrapment doc-
trine, which contemplates substantial changes in the existing law.77
68. Id. at 674.
69. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
70. 459 F.2d at 674.
71. 411 U.S. at 431-33. In Raley v. Ohio, 360 US. 423 (1959), defendants were prose-
cuted for failing to testify before a state investigative body, whose chairman had assured
them, apparently in good faith, that the state constitution guaranteed them immunity from
self-incrimination. This "entrapment" was held to have violated due process. Id. at 442. The
dissimilarity of these facts to the paradigmatic formulation of encouragement-entrapment,
discussed at notes 6 & 7 supra and accompanying text, makes Raley poor authority for
basing the entrapment doctrine on due process grounds. One commentator, however, has
proposed a graduation of the true entrapment doctrine to constitutional status. Note, The
Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment De-
fense, 74 Yale L.J. 942 (1965).
72. 411 US. at 431.
73. Id. at 431-32.
74. Id. at 433.
75. Id. at 434-35.
76. Id. at 433.
77. Id. n.9.
"Entrapment (a) Bar.-It is a bar to prosecution that the defendant was entrapped into
engaging in prohibited conduct.
(b) Occurrence.-Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person requested
by a law enforcement officer to assist him induces or encourages a person to engage in
prohibited conduct, using such methods of inducement or encouragement as create a sub-
stantial risk that the conduct would be committed by persons other than those who are
ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to engage in pro-
hibited conduct does not constitute entrapment. A risk is less substantial where a person
has previously engaged in similarly prohibited conduct and such conduct is known to
such officer as [sic] a person assisting him.
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Having left Sorrells intact, the Court touched upon the lower court depar-
tures from that case. Emphasizing that the subjective theory did not give the
courts a "chancellor's foot" veto over questioned law enforcement methods, the
Court denounced the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Russell as "contrary to the
holdings of this Court. 78 Neither the contraband cases nor the Greene line
were disapproved specifically, but inasmuch as the court of appeals expressly
had relied on both, presumably both have been rejected, at least implicitly. The
Court's subsequent treatment of one of the contraband cases indicates exactly
that.
79
From the Court's reaffirmation of Sorrells there were two dissenting opinions.
That of Justice Douglas identified itself with the objective theory of entrap-
ment, and sought to ground the contraband cases squarely within its tenets.80
It was left to Justice Stewart"' to assume the mantle of chief activist for the
objective theory. Justice Stewart asserted that only the objective theory is
consistent with the underlying rationale of the entrapment defense, i.e., the
manufacture of crime by the government.8 2 He also rejected statutory con-
struction as the basis of the defense: entrapment by definition does not come
into play until a proscribed act has been committed, and it is illogical to decide
at that point that Congress intended not to proscribe the act after all.83 Justice
Stewart, however, then erased Justice Frankfurter's major contribution to the
objective theory. It is apparently Justice Stewart's intent to turn from super-
visory powers and return the objective theory's doctrinal basis to the public
policy of preserving the integrity of the courts. 4 If such is his intent, he has
unfortunately placed the objective theory back into the lion's mouth from
(c) No Bar.-The bar to prosecution afforded by this section is unavailable when causing
or threatening serious bodily injury is the prohibited conduct." S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §
1-3B2 (1973).
The section's dissimilarities from the subjective theory are substantial. The first sentence
of (b) is closely similar to Justice Frankfurter's objective test, set forth at text accom-
panying note 57 supra. The second sentence is common ground to both subjective and ob-
jective theories. The third sentence appears, unfortunately, to preserve the notion that
what is impermissible vis-h-vis the law-abiding citizen may yet be permissible against a
chronic offender. However, under this clause, a prior course of criminal conduct must be
known, and not merely suspected. Subdivision (c) is an attempt to resolve the issue which
the courts employing the subjective theory are supposed to decide, yet do not (i.e., whether
entrapment is available regardless of the nature of the prohibited conduct), discussed at
text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
78. 411 U.S. at 435.
79. United States v. McGrath, 412 U.S. 936 (1973) (mem.), vacating 468 F.2d 1027
(7th Cir. 1972). See United States v. Workopich, 479 F.2d 1142, 1144-45 (Sth Cir. 1973)
(post-Russell).
80. 411 U.S. at 436-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
81. Justice Stewart's opinion was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice
Brennan also joined Justice Douglas's opinion.
82. 411 U.S. at 441-42 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see text accompanying note 41 supra.
83. 411 U.S. at 441-42 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 439, 441-44 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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which Justice Frankfurter had extracted it.65 Justice Stewart's application of
the objective test to the facts at bar turned on the scarcity of P-2-P that
prevailed because several large drug firms had ceased production at the
government's request8 6 Russell would have found it very difficult to commit
his crime had he not been supplied with the ingredient. Under the objective
theory, the government had gone too far.87
The objective theory, however, has never been the law. It is Sorrells which
presents the definitive analysis underlying both the statutory construction basis
and the genesis of intent test of the subjective theory of entrapment. In con-
text, Sherman, and now Russell, essentially amount to little more than state-
ments that no good reasons exist to warrant a reexamination of that landmark
case. The hint in Russell that entrapment may at some point assume constitu-
tional dimensions8 8 does not change this; if the Court did not find such a case
in Russell or in the cases it tacitly labelled at odds with the subjective theory,89
then the constitutional threshold is indeed very far away.
Thus, Russell for all practical purposes affirms the subjective theory as a
matter of stare decisis. The constancy lent the law by this doctrine is dearly
bought when the constant is inequity. Nine justices 0 deciding Sorrells, Sher-
man, and Russell have written or joined opinions indicting the subjective theory
as fictitious in its basis, inconsistent in its formulation of a test for all cases,
and possessed of undesirable practical consequences. The vast majority of the
commentators to varying degrees have aligned themselves with these criticisms.91
As might be expected, the first cases to consider Russell are not in complete
agreement that it has settled the law.92 But neither torrents of criticism from
85. The objections to the public policy basis are discussed at notes 53 & 54 supra and
accompanying text.
86. 411 U.S. at 426-27.
87. Id. at 449-50 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 431-32 (opinion of the Court).
89. See id. at 435.
90. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) (Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dis-
senting); id. at 439 (Stewart, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter, Douglas, Harlan & Brennan, JJ., concurring) ;
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932) (Roberts, Brandeis & Stone, JJ., con-
curring).
91. E.g., Bancroft, supra note 2, at 170-71; Donnelly, supra note 3, at 1107-08, 1110,
1113-14; Mikeli, supra note 38, at 250-52, 255-59; Rotenberg, supra note 4, at 897-99; Note,
Entrapment: An Analysis of Disagreement, 45 B.U.L. Rev. 542, 556-57 (1965); Note, En-
trapment, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1333, 1336-37 (1960); Note, Judicial Control of Secret Agents,
76 Yale L.J. 994, 994-95 & nn.6-7 (1967); Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat:
The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 Yale L.J. 942, 943 (1965); 33
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1033, 1038-41 (1958). But see DeFeo, supra note 9, at 273-76.
92. The majority of the cases to consider Russell have taken it as settling the law of
entrapment. United States v. Rosner, No. 73-1511 (2d Cir., Sept. 26, 1973); United States
v. Ewbank, 483 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnson, 484 F.2d 165 (9th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Workopich, 479 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1973). But see United
States v. Archer, Nos. 73-1527, 73-1528, 73-1711 (2d Cir. July 12, 1973) (dictum).
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Supreme Court minorities and legal scholars, nor dozens of discordant lower
court cases can alter the hard fact that the Court has analyzed definitively the
entrapment doctrine once, and twice reaffirmed its analysis.
Edmund P. Bergan, Jr.
Federal Courts-Procedure-Denial of Franchise to Prisoners Awaiting
Trial Requires Convening of Three-Judge Court Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2281.--Prisoners awaiting trial in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, brought
an injunctive class action in a federal district court alleging that the Pennsylvania
Election Code was unconstitutional because it denied them the right to vote.
Appearing before a single district judge, Commonwealth officials conceded that
the Election Code as applied to the prisoners was unconstitutional; but
municipal officials, also named as defendants in the action and not bound
under Pennsylvania law by their co-defendants' concession, defended the
statute. The judge deemed the Commonwealth officials the principal defendants
and decided that their concession rendered the court without jurisdiction be-
cause no case or controversy was presented. He therefore dismissed the case
and did not empanel the three-judge court normally required by 28 U.S.C. §
2281 when an injunction against a state law is sought in a federal court on
grounds of unconstitutionality. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the dismissal, not for the absence of a case or controversy, but for the lack of a
substantial constitutional question.1 The court of appeals cited McDonald v.
Board of Election,2 which held that a state's failure to provide absentee ballots
for prisoners awaiting trial was not unconstitutional, 8 and decided that the
Pennsylvania prisoners' constitutional claim was, therefore, insubstantial.4 A
unanimous Supreme Court, however, rejected the reasoning of both lower
courts and remanded the case for a hearing by a three-judge court to be em-
panelled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281.5
The district judge had "clearly erred,"6 the Court ruled. Since municipal
officials were not bound by the concession of the Commonwealth officials and,
in fact, had continued to assert the constitutionality of the statute, "the con-
cession of the Commonwealth officials could not have the effect of dissipating
the existence of a case or controversy." 7 The court of appeals also had erred,
for its reliance on McDonald was not justified. In that case, the prisoners did
not allege that they were denied the right to vote but only that they were denied
the use of absentee ballots; hence, the McDonald Court refused to assume that
the right to vote per se had been denied.8 The Philadelphia prisoners, on the
1. Goosby v. Osser, 452 F.2d 39, 40 (3d Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 512 (1973).
2. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
3. Id. at 810.
4. 452 F.2d 39, 40.
5. Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973).
6. Id. at 516.
7. Id. at 517.
8. 394 U.S. 802, 807-08 (1969). The Court said there was no indication "that the State
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other hand, alleged not only that they were denied absentee ballots but also
that they were denied any alternative means of voting. Thus, concluded the
Court, the two cases were distinguishable. Constitutional claims are insub-
stantial only if "prior decisions inescapably render the claims frivolous."' 0
Whatever its merits, the Philadelphia prisoners' claim was not inescapably
rendered frivolous by McDonald. Therefore, it was not insubstantial, and the
case required consideration by a three-judge district court convened pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2281. Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973).
The critical statute here relevant reads:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or
execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State
in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an administra-
tive board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by any
district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such
statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of
three judges under section 2284 of this title.'"
This section, together with supplementary provisions, was enacted originally
in 1910,' 2 but has undergone frequent amendment since that time.13 The
might not, for instance, possibly furnish the jails with special polling booths or facilities on
election day, or provide guarded transportation to the polls themselves for certain in-
mates, or entertain motions for temporary reductions in bail to allow some inmates to get
to the polls on their own." Id. at 808 n.6.
9. 409 U.S. at 513-14.
10. Id. at 518.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). This case note deals only with the three-judge require-
ment in attacks on state statutes and administrative orders set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2281
(1970). Three-judge federal district courts are required in a number of other cases. The
most important of these are: (1) certain suits to enforce antitrust and interstate com-
merce laws (15 U.S.C. § 28; 49 U.S.C. § 44 (1970)); (2) suits seeking to enjoin the opera-
tion of federal statutes as unconstitutional (28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970)); (3) suits seeking to
restrain orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission (28 US.C. § 2325 (1970)), and (4)
certain suits to enforce orders of the Federal Communications Commission (47 U.S.C. §
401(d) (1970)).
12. Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557. The statute was codified in 1911
as section 266 of the Judicial Code. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 266, 36 Stat. 1162. The
original statute has since been separated into its component parts and now appears, as
amended, in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253 (providing direct appeal to the Supreme Court), 2281 (set
forth in text), and 2284 (prescribing composition and procedure for the three-judge court).
13. The original statute referred only to suits against state "statutes" but in 1913, it
was amended to include suits against state administrative orders. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch.
160, 37 Stat. 1013 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970)). The 1913 legislature also saw fit
to provide for abstention by the three-judge court in certain cases where the statute or
order in question was being considered by a state court. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 160, 37
Stat. 1013 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2284(5) (1970)). The latter amendment has been de-
scribed as "unrelated and little-used." Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Con-
stitutional Litigation, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 12-13 n.68 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Currie];
see Note, A Survey of the Three Judge Requirement, 47 Geo. L.J. 161, 164 (1958).
The original statute applied only to applications for interlocutory injunctions, with the
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legislative purpose behind the Act has been the subject of some confusion," '
but the broad raison d'gtre of the Act seems clear: to protect state policy from
the caprice of a single federal judge."; Ex parte Young, 1 which had affirmed the
power of a federal judge to enjoin the operation of allegedly unconstitutional
state laws, provided impetus for the enactment.17 Precedent for the procedure
was found in the three-judge mechanism already established to enforce the
Interstate Commerce Act and to enjoin violations of antitrust acts.18
In theory, the three-judge procedure is quite simple: (1) the cases described
by 28 U.S.C. § 2281 are decided by three judges sitting as a district court;
and (2) appeal from that decision lies directly and of right to the Supreme
Court.19 Unfortunately, the procedure has not been so simple in practice. The
statutes involved, particularly section 2281, have remained, despite amendment,
both ambiguous and incomplete,20 creating a "procedural labyrinth,"2 into
which the unwary litigant descends at his peril. The problematic threshold
question-whether or not to convene a three-judge court in the first instance-
must, of course, be decided by a single judge; but this question the statute
fails to consider. Must the single judge convene the larger court simply because
it is requested? If not, when must he convene it, and when may he decline
anomalous result that three judges ruled on the interlocutory injunction, but only one
judge ruled on the permanent injunction. The Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 238(3), 43
Stat. 938, apparently intended to remedy this situation by saying that the three-judge re-
quirement "shall also apply to the final hearing." The Supreme Court interpreted this to
mean that three judges were required if both interlocutory and permanent injunctions were
sought in the same suit, but that an application for permanent relief only did not require
three judges. Smith v. Wilson, 273 U.S. 388, 391 (1927). In 1948 the words "or permanent"
were added to section 2281. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 151, § 2281, 62 Stat. 968. This made
it clear that three judges were required to hear applications for either type of injunction.
14. Note, The Three-Judge District Court: Scope and Procedure Under Section 2281, 77
Harv. L. Rev. 299, 300 (1963).
15. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941); Cumberland Tel. Co. v. Louisi-
ana Pub. Serw. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 212, 216 (1922); Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges,
47 Har. L. Rev. 795, 812-13 (1934); Note, A Survey of the Three Judge Requirement, 47
Geo. L.J. 161, 163 (1958).
"It is a matter of history that this procedural device [the three-judge court] was a means
of protecting the increasing body of state legislation regulating economic enterprise from
invalidation by a conventional suit in equity." Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250
(1941).
16. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
17. Florida Lime Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 77 (1960); see Comment, Re-
quirement of Substantial Constitutional Question in Federal Three-Judge Court Cases, 19
La. L. Rev. 813, 814-15 (1959).
18. Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, 32 Stat. 823 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1970) and 49
U.S.C. § 44 (1970)).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
20. See Currie 12-13. "The reviser, who failed to combine §§ 2281 and 2282, should be
immersed for twelve years in a pot of his own verbiage." Id. at 12 n.67.
21. Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170, 187 (2d Cir. 1969) (Feinberg, J., dissenting), rev'd,
397 U.S. 397 (1970).
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to do so? Who is to review his determination? Over the years, these questions
have been left to case law, and even so, not fully resolved. No case found has
held that a three-judge court must be convened merely because it is requested. -
The question of appellate review of the threshold determination is a labyrinth
in itself,23 but it appears at last near a resolution in favor of the courts of
appeals. 24
The problem presented by Goosby remains: when may the single judge de-
cline to convene the larger court? Some answers have been provided. Cases
presenting both constitutional and non-constitutional grounds for decision have
required the three-judge court even though they might have been resolved
without reaching the constitutional question.25 Cases arising solely under the
supremacy clause of the Constitution are not within the purview of section
2281.26 Similarly, suits seeking to restrain purely executive action2 and chal-
lenges to state statutes not of "statewide" applicationm do not require the
convening of a section 2281 court. Many questions, however, remain un-
answered. Justice Frankfurter has said that the section is to be regarded "not
as a measure of broad social policy to be construed with great liberality, but as
an enactment technical in the strict sense of the term and to be applied as
22. Cf. Bowen, Note, 28 Minn. L. Rev. 131, 132 (1944). But cf. Currie 22.
23. The paradigm case of the appellate review dilemma is Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
Corp. v. Epstein, 370 US. 713 (1962). In Idlewild, the district judge refused to convene a
three-judge court. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 188 F. Supp. 434 (Si).
N.Y. 1960). The court of appeals, however, determined that the case properly was within
the purview of section 2281 and thus required the convening of a three-judge court; but,
having made that determination, the circuit court found itself ipso facto without jurisdic-
tion over the appeal, since appeal from a case "required by any Act of Congress to be
heard and determined by a district court of three judges" lies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1253
(1970), directly to the Supreme Court. Idiewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 289
F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1961). "To be sure," said Judge Waterman, "this result leaves us in a
somewhat anomalous position." Id. at 429. On remand to the district court, the district
judge took his circuit court brethren at their word, declared their opinion dictum, and again
refused to convene a three-judge court. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 194
F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The Supreme Court, on certiorari, decided the case required
three judges, and remanded to the district court with instructions to convene a three-judge
court. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962). The three-judge
court was convened then and the merits of the case considered for the first time. Idlewild
Bon-Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 212 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd sub nom.
Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
24. Currie, Appellate Review of the Decision Whether or Not to Empanel a Three-
Judge Federal Court, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 159 (1969).
25. E.g., Florida Lime Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 85 (1960).
26. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 125-27 (1965), overruling Kesler v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 91, 217-20 (1966).
27. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 252 (1941).




such." 29 But the doctrine of strict construction is not a solution to the interpre-
tive problems of the section. Indeed, due to the operation of inherently con-
tradictory forces, the section seems immune to any remedy short of repeal.80
On the one hand, to effectuate the protective purposes of the Act,3 ' the powers
of the single judge must be constricted. On the other hand, the conservation of
judicial resources3 2 would seem to require the expansion of the powers of the
single judge. Something more than a superficial claim must be demanded in
order to justify the drain upon judicial resources created by the three-judge
procedure. In trying to define this "something more," while balancing the
contradictory forces just described, the Supreme Court has evolved the
"insubstantial question '3 3 rule.
Ex parte Poresky34 was the first case squarely to affirm the jurisdictional
power of a district court judge to dismiss a case without convening a three-
judge court where the constitutional question was insubstantial., After Poresky,
29. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941).
30. Chief Justice Burger has called for the abolition of the three-judge court procedure.
Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.BA.J. 1049, 1053 (1972).
31. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
32. See Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.AJ. 1049 (1972).
33. This case note assumes that "substantial" is the word which describes both sufficient
federal questions and sufficient section 2281 questions. It further assumes that if a question
is not "substantial," it is then "insubstantial," and vice-versa. The phrases used in the
cases (e.g., "wholly insubstantial," "obviously without merit," "inescapably frivolous") are
understood to be attempts to clarify the meaning of substantiality and not to be separate
standards in themselves. In other words, this case note assumes not a hierarchy of suffi-
ciency, but a dichotomy: substantial and insubstantial questions.
34. 290 U.S. 30 (1933) (per curiam).
35. This holding had been foreshadowed by dicta in several earlier cases. Take, for
example, the curious language in Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539 (1911),
the first case to interpret the 1910 Act. Although the Act said an interlocutory injunction
in the prescribed cases could not be granted by a single judge, Ex parte Metropolitan Water
Co. decided that the injunction could be neither granted nor denied by the single judge:
"[Tjhe statute evidences the purpose of Congress that the application for the interlocutory
injunction should be heard before the enlarged court, whether the claim of unconstitu-
tionality be or be not meritorious . . . . Congress [has] declared that the merits of the
application for an interlocutory injunction . . . should be considered and determined by
a tribunal consisting of three judges . . . ." Id. at 545. The apparent implication of the
language is that jurisdictional questions, as opposed to questions of the merits, do not
require the larger court. Two years later, in Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Garrett, 231 U.S.
298 (1913), Justice Hughes stated that the three-judge court statute "applies to cases in
which the preliminary injunction is sought in order to restrain the enforcement of a state
enactment upon the ground of its 'unconstitutionality.' The reference, undoubtedly, is to an
asserted conflict with the Federal Constitution, and the question of unconstitutionality, in
this sense, must be a substantial one." Id. at 304 (dictum). The language is only dictum,
but its import is clear: since the statute only applies when the question of unconstitutionality
is substantial, someone, presumably the single judge, must make that determination before
a three-judge court can be convened. And if the judge can decide the question is substantial
and convene the larger court, he must also be able to judge it insubstantial and decline to
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a Massachusetts citizen,36 had been denied a motor vehicle registration for
failure to comply with that state's compulsory automobile liability insurance
statute, he sought to enjoin its enforcement as a violation of the fourteenth
amendment. A single district judge dismissed Poresky's complaint and the
Supreme Court denied application for leave to file a petition for mandamus to
compel the district judge to convene a three-judge court.37
The Court noted the absence of power in the single judge to dismiss on the
merits.8
But the provision requiring the presence of a court of three judges necessarily as-
sumes that the District Court has jurisdiction.... That provision does not
require three judges to pass upon this initial question of jurisdiction.
. . . [T]he District Judge clearly has authority to dismiss for the want of jurisdic-
tion when the question lacks the necessary substance and no other ground of jurisdic-
tion appears. Such was his authority in the instant case, in view of the decisions of
this Court bearing upon the constitutional authority of the State, acting in the
interest of public safety, to enact the statute assailed.39
The Court did not explain exactly why Poresky's claim lacked the "necessary
substance;" it simply cited its earlier decisions affirming a state's power to
regulate motor vehicles.40 However, the Court did attempt a two-point exposition
of the insubstantial question concept: A question is insubstantial when (I) it is
"'obviously without merit' ,,41 or (2) "'its unsoundness so clearly results from
the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject and leave no
room for the inference that the question sought to be raised can be the sub-
ject of controversy.' "42 The exposition was brief and the expository language
was borrowed,43 but Poresky brought three-judge court procedure into a new
convene the larger court. The requirement of a substantial question of constitutionality is
reiterated in Ex parte Buder, 271 U.S. 461, 467 (1926) (dictum) and in Stratton v. St.
Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10, 15 (1930) (dictum).
36. The absence of diversity of citizenship is important. It has been argued that a state
citizen who brings a suit in federal court under section 2281 may have that suit dismissed
for want of a substantial federal question; but that the same suit by an out-of-state citizen
may be retained by the court because of the existence of diversity jurisdiction. Berg, Three-
Judge District Courts: Some Jurisdictional Problems, 46 A.B.A.J. 291, 293 (1960). Other
aspects of this problem are discussed in text accompanying notes 47-49 infra.
37. 290 U.S. at 30-31.
38. Id. at 31.
39. Id. at 31-32 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 32.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105-06 (1933); Hannis Distilling
Co. v. Balitmore, 216 U.S. 285, 288 (1910) ; McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 80 (1909). Two
of these cases were decided before the 1910 three-judge statute and all three dealt vith the
necessity of a substantial federal question to confer federal question jurisdiction. Thus, Ex
parte Poresky seemed to apply federal question terminology to the three-judge procedure.
For a fuller treatment of Poresky's holding see text accompanying notes 47-51 infra.
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era. Despite controversy, confusion, and a 1942 enactment 44 which some
initially interpreted as overruling Poresky,45 the case has proved a "hardy
weed"4 6 endowed with unusual staying power.
The problem with the Poresky case is that its holding is ambiguous. On the
one hand, it may be regarded as an ordinary Article III decision denying federal
jurisdiction absent diversity or a substantial federal question.47 Under this
view, the absence of diversity of citizenship and the determination that there
was no substantial federal question disposed of the case without further
inquiry; thus, any language going to the three-judge question is regarded as
dictum. On the other hand, the case is said to support the proposition that a
substantial question of unconstitutionality is a prerequisite to the convening of
a three-judge court.48  This reading would mean there were really two
analytically distinct substantiality questions fused together in Poresky:
(1) substantiality for purposes of federal jurisdiction (i.e., a substantial federal
question) and (2) substantiality for purposes of section 2281 (i.e., a sub-
stantial claim of unconstitutionality) .4 9 Poresky's ambiguity results because
both questions were resolved in the negative, at once, and by the same criterion.
It remained for Bailey v. Patterson50 to establish beyond doubt the existence
of a section 2281 substantiality requirement quite apart from the federal
jurisdictional requirement.,"
In Bailey, a three-judge court was convened5 2 because the plaintiffs, Missis-
sippi blacks, sought injunctions to enforce their constitutional right to unseg-
regated transportation, a right allegedly denied them under color of state lawr a
The three-judge court abstained, pending construction of the challenged statutes
44. Act of April 6, 1942, ch. 210, § 3, 56 Stat. 199 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2284(5)
(1970)). This provision denies a single judge power to order references to masters, to deter-
mine applications for interlocutory injunctions, or to dismiss suits or enter judgments, but
applies only after it is determined that the case is one properly requiring three judges.
45. Berueffy, The Three Judge Federal Court: Recent Statutory Limitations, 15 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 64, 73 (1942); see H.M. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 972 (2d ed. 1973).
46. Currie 22.
47. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403 n.3 (1970); Wilentz v. Sovereign Camp,
306 U.S. 573, 582 (1939).
48. E.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 91 n.4 (1968); Water Serv. Co. v. City of Red-
ding, 304 U.S. 252, 254 (1938); Pervis v. LaMarque Ind. School Dist., 466 F.2d 1054, 1037
n.2 (5th Cir. 1972).
49. To put the problem in the terminology of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: was
Ex parte Poresky a 12(b)(1) case (lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter), or was it
a 12(b) (6) case (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted)? Or was It
both? See Note, The Three-Judge District Court: Scope and Procedure Under Section 2281,
77 Harv. L. Rev. 299, 308 (1963).
50.: 369 U.S. 31 (1962).
51. Id. at 33; see Note, The Three-Judge District Court and Appellate Review, 49 Va.
L. Rev. 538, 551 (1963).
52. See Bailey v. Patterson, 199 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1961).
53. 369 U.S. at 32; 199 F. Supp. at 596.
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by state courts,54 and a direct appeal of the abstention was taken to the
Supreme Court. The Court said:
We have settled beyond question that no State may require racial segregation of
interstate or intrastate transportation facilities. . . The question is no longer
open; it is foreclosed as a litigable issue. Section 2281 does not require a three-
judge court when the claim that a statute is unconstitutional is wholly insubstantial,
legally speaking nonexistent. . . . We hold that three judges are similarly not re-
quired when, as here, prior decisions make frivolous any claim that a state statute
on its face is not unconstitutional. 5
The Court remanded, directing the district judge to take jurisdiction and grant
relief without convening a three-judge court.56 It is clear from Bailey that the
substantiality issue in putative three-judge cases is not necessarily a jurisdic-
tional one. There was no diversity of citizenship in Bailey, so federal jurisdic-
tion must have been based on a substantial federal question 5  but the
constitutional question was deemed insubstantial for purposes of the three-
judge court. Thus, the two questions fused together by circumstance in
Poresky became quite distinct in Bailey: (1) for purposes of federal jurisdic-
tion the question was substantial, but (2) for purposes of section 2281 the
question was insubstantial.
Taken together (but perhaps with emphasis on the less ambiguous Bailey),
Poresky and Bailey comprise the insubstantial question rule and would appear
to admit of summary: Poresky allows the single judge to deny relief without
convening a three-judge court when the constitutional attack is insubstantial;
Bailey allows the single judge to grant relief without convening a three-judge
court when the constitutional defense is insubstantial. 9
The most obvious defect of the insubstantiality rule is readily apparent
from Goosby v. Osser.60 The rule is vague,"' whether the test of insubstantiality
be "obviously without merit"62 or "foreclosed by previous decisions."r, As to
the former formulation, Professor Currie has asked: "Since a single judge may
not dismiss a constitutional claim that is 'not meritorious,' why may he dismiss
one that is 'obviously without merit?' "04 Seemingly in reply, the Goosby
opinion states that "[t]he limiting words 'wholly' and 'obviously' have cogent
legal significance."65 But what is obvious to one judge is not necessarily obvious
to another. That, at least, is obvious. As to the latter formulation, an insub-
34. 199 F. Supp. at 603.
55. 369 U.S. at 33 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 34.
57. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(1970).
58. See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
59. See text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
60. 409 U.S. 512 (1973).
61. See Berueffy, supra note 45, at 71-72.
62. 409 U.S. at 518.
63. Id.
64. Currie 22.
65. 409 U.S. at 518. But see note 33 supra.
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stantial question, as defined in Poresky, was one whose "'unsoundness so
clearly results from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the
subject and leave no room for the inference that the question sought to be
raised can be the subject of controversy.' "66 The explanation of this language
given by the Goosby Court, i.e., that a question is insubstantial if it is
inescapably rendered frivolous by previous decisions,0 7 does not cure its
vagueness. What is foreclosed for one judge is not necessarily foreclosed for
another. This is shown by the history of Goosby. A petition for rehearing en
banc was denied, 8 apparently because the majority agreed that the Goosby
plaintiffs' claims were foreclosed by the McDonald decision; but three judges
did not agree.69 Displaying impressive prescience, the dissenters noted the
same distinction that the Supreme Court would later note7 ---the allegation in
Goosby of denial of the vote as against the allegation in McDonald of denial
of the absentee ballot. It is as hard to know what is foreclosed by previous
decisions as it is to know what is obviously without merit.
A more serious defect than vagueness, however, is that the insubstantial
question rule wastes time-particularly the Supreme Court's time. Many cases
require a double appellate proceeding. William Berueffy has made the point
succinctly:
In the first instance it [is] argued: this statute is unconstitutional, to which the
Court replie[s], that is a substantial question. Then the case [is] argued before
the three judge district court, and upon appeal. The Court then might con-
sider the matter on the merits.71
This is the exact procedure which will evolve in Goosby should either side be
dissatisfied with the ruling of the three-judge court, and appeal to the Supreme
Court from the three-judge ruling is as of right.7 2
The three-judge court procedure has been criticized for many things,T but
it has been criticized most consistently for the added burden it places on the
federal judiciary.74 It requires three judges instead of one (not only do calendars
stagnate, but it may be physically difficult and time-consuming to get three
66. 290 U.S. at 32 (citations omitted).
67. 409 U.S. at 518.
68. 452 F.2d 39, 41.
69. Id. (Adams, Rosenn & Van Dusen, JJ., dissenting).
70. 409 U.S. at 522.
71. Berueffy, supra note 45, at 72.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
73. See Comment, The Three-Judge Federal Court in Constitutional Litigation: A Pro-
cedural Anachronism, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 555 (1960).
74. E.g., Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Oklahoma Packing Co., 292 U.S. 386, 391 (1934);
Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court
(1972) (The Freund Report), reproduced at 57 F.R.D. 573, 598 (Report discussed In Com-
ment, The National Court of Appeals: Composition, Constitutionality and Desirability, 41
Fordham L. Rev. 863 (1973)) ; C. Wright, Federal Courts, § 50, at 194 (2d ed. 1970 & Supp.
1972).
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judges together).75 It produces repetitious litigation of the threshold question
up and down the federal judicial system. And, the decision of the three-judge
court, once properly convened, produces a direct appeal as of right 
to the
already crushingly overburdened Supreme Court. Chief Justice Burger 
recently
has recommended abolition of the three-judge court procedure because of the
unacceptable burden it places on the federal courtsY An amendment to 
section
2281, proposed in 1971, would eliminate the requirement of a three-judge
panel.77 Though the Supreme Court is without power to amend 
the statute,
the Court, in the past, has manifested its concern for the problem in a 
judicial
fashion: it has promulgated a series of decisions limiting the application 
of
section 2281. The insubstantiality rule of Bailey and Poresky is perhaps 
the
prime, but by no means the only, example of a definite trend toward 
limita-
tion.7 8 Goosby does not continue the trend. The decision comes at a time 
when
an expansion of the single judge's powers seemed probable; but Goosby appears
to limit, rather than expand, the powers of the single judge.
The decision in Goosby has much to commend it to those who marvel 
at
judicial sleight of hand. While citing Poresky and Bailey, landmark cases in
the expansion of the single judge's powers under section 2281, the Court has
in fact promulgated a constrictive precedent. Although the tests of 
insub-
stantiality in Goosby are virtually identical to those of earlier cases, 
the
emphasis and spirit of their application is new. The emphasis now is on words
such as "obviously," "clearly," and "inescapably," and the spirit is 
one of
scrupulous legal scrutiny. Where none before (except the three circuit court
dissenters) had perceived a substantial question, the Court in Goosby not only
found such a question but did so unanimously. The almost cavalier attitude 
of
Poresky is gone. In Poresky it was sufficient to declare the question 
insub-
stantial "in view of the decisions of this Court bearing upon the constitutional
authority of the State . .. to enact the statute assailed."
78 No further ex-
planation was offered. But the Court in Goosby saw fit not only to examine 
the
prior decision relied on, but also to scrutinize that decision and to construe 
it
strictly.
It can be expected that the Court's new attitude will not go unnoticed. 
In
fact, Goosby already has forced the Southern District of New York to change
its position in one case.80 There, plaintiffs alleged certain provisions 
of the
75. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Taitano, 125 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D. Guam 1954).
76. Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A.J. 1049, 
1053 (1972);
N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1973, at 17, col. 1.
77. H.R. 3805, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reproduced at Ammerman, Three-Judge
Courts: See How They Run!, 52 F.R.D. 293, 313 (1971).
78. See Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 
U.S. 111
(1965), overruling Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); 
Phillips v.
United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941); Note, The Three-judge Court Reassessed: 
Changing
Roles in Federal-State Relationships, 72 Yale L.J. 1646, 1647 
(1963). See generally H.M.
Hart & H. Wechsler, supra note 45, at 972-75.
79. 290 U.S. at 32.




New York Penal Law, dealing with reformatory sentences, were unconstitutional
on their face and moved to convene a three-judge court to consider the
question. The motion was denied because the district court felt that the
constitutional question had been foreclosed by prior decisions of higher courts.s t
Three months later, plaintiffs successfully moved for reconsideration of the
denial in light of Goosby, which had just been decided. The court said: "In
light of the Goosby language and holding, there is no doubt, as a brief analysis
will show, that reconsideration of our prior decision is necessary, and that
the issues previously held to be foreclosed should be submitted to the three-
judge court ... ."2 The ground for the prior denial was the similarity of the
New York statute to the Federal Youth Corrections Act which frequently had
been upheld in the face of constitutional challenge. However, in its recon-
sideration the court felt that "the analogous federal statute differs from New
York's provisions in one respect which in the light of Goosby may be con-
sidered material."' 8 3 The prior decisions upholding the federal statute were on
point, and perhaps even controlling; but, as the district court emphasized, they
did not inescapably render the claims Jrivolous.8 4 The decision is clearly in
conformity with the new, constrictive mandate of Goosby.
In a recent Second Circuit decision,8 5 then Chief Judge Friendly com-
mented on the curious result in Goosby: "In the face of recent strong advocacy
of the abolition of the three-judge court requirement in constitutional cases, a
unanimous Supreme Court has just defined the standard permitting a single
judge to dismiss a complaint seeking an injunction on the ground of unconsti-
tutionality in the most limiting terms the Court has ever used."8 0 The case
involved an appeal from a dismissal by a district judge and the court of appeals,
in conformity with Goosby's constrictive mandate, reversed with instructions
to the district judge to convene a three-judge court. 87 If other district and
circuit courts are as quick to grasp the significance of Goosby, it is to be ex-
pected that fewer and fewer alleged section 2281 cases will be deemed resolvable
without a three-judge court, and if there is no diminution of attacks upon state
statutes, the result will be to require more and more three-judge courts.
The question raised by this result is why was Goosby decided as it was? As
previously indicated, the time seemed ripe for a rule expansive of the single
judge's power. It is curious that a unanimous Court should decide at this
time to take a narrow view of the powers of the single judge. One answer,
albeit purely speculative, is that Goosby was a judicial nudging of the Con-
81. Sero v. Oswald, 351 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). "Applying this ["foreclosed by
previous decisions"] test, it is clear that the issue of whether the provisions of the statute
before us are unconstitutional on their face is foreclosed." Id. at 526. A different result was
reached on the potential unconstitutionality of the provisions as applied. Id. at 528-29.
82. 355 F. Supp. at 1233 (footnote omitted).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1973)
86. Id. at 105-06 (footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 109.
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gress 8 Perhaps the Court was really saying that amendment or repeal of the
three-judge court procedure is not a judicial but a legislative burden, and
that it is now time for the legislature to shoulder that burden. Perhaps the
Court was really saying that it refuses to do the legislature's work. If so--if
this is the real meaning of Goosby--perhaps Congress will perceive the
problem and act. But if it does not-if legislative change is not forthcoming-
it can be expected that the severity of the Goosby precedent will soon prove
intolerable and that the judiciary eventually will relax the constrictive mandate
of the case.
Charles H. Cochran
Federal Courts-Procedure-Review of the Actions of the Judicial Council
of the Circuit.-Pursuant to a resolution of the Judicial Council' of the
Third Circuit, a district court judge removed Joseph M. Nolan as counsel to
the trustee in a Chapter X reorganization.2 Seeking personal vindication, Nolan
88. It may be noted with some irony that it was judicial action, albeit inadvertent,
which originally prompted enactment of the three-judge procedure. See notes 15-17 supra
and accompanying text.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1970) provides in pertinent part: "(a) The chief judge of each cir-
cuit shall call, at least twice in each year and at such places as he may designate, a council
of the circuit judges for the circuit, in regular active service, at which he shall preside. Each
circuit judge, unless excused by the chief judge, shall attend all sessions of the council.
(b) The council shall be known as the Judicial Council of the circuit.
(c) The chief judge shall submit to the council the quarterly reports of the Director of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The council shall take such action
thereon as may be necessary.
(d) Each judicial council shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts within its circuit. The district judges shall
promptly carry into effect all orders of the judicial council."
2. Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500, 501 (D.N.J.
1972), aff'd sub nom. In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
94 S. Ct. 71 (1973). The order of removal stated in pertinent part:
"It had been the opinion of [the district court] that limitations imposed upon the func-
tion of Joseph M. Nolan, Esq., as counsel for the Trustee provided protection against
any conflict of interest or even the appearance thereof. Such opinion of the Court has
been overruled by the above cited resolution of the Council [see text at note IS infral
and this Court considers the resolution as a mandate to terminate the services of counsel
to the Trustee ....
... It is ... clear to this Court that it must give effect to the resolution of the
Circuit Council ...
Accordingly, it is . . . oaRnanm that the legal services of Joseph M. Nolan, Esq,
as counsel for the Trustee be and the same hereby are terminated effective immediately."
In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., No. B-656-65 (D.N.J., May 2, 1972) (mem. & order),
cited in Petitioner's Motion for Leave to File Petition for Writ of Prohibition and/or
Mandamus at 2a-3a, Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 409 US. 822 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Motion].
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was faced with the dilemma that there was neither statutory authority nor
precedent for the review of resolutions adopted by circuit councils.0 Assuming
jurisdiction, a three-judge panel4 sitting by designation in the Third Circuit
reviewed the removal order, thereby establishing a necessary and logical prece-
dent for the review of the actions of a circuit council. In re Imperial "400"
National, Inc., 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 71 (1973) [here-
inafter referred to as Nolan]."
Nolan, an established bankruptcy lawyer, had been appointed counsel to
the trustee in a Chapter X reorganization in 1966.0 During the course of the
prolonged reorganization, friction developed between one of the creditors and
Nolan concerning inter alia the amount of interim payments allotted to Nolan
and the trustee. This dispute gave rise to litigation resulting in an order direct-
ing Nolan to return a portion of his interim allowance. 7 In 1971, in the midst
of this feuding, Schiavone Construction Co., a client of Nolan's law firm, indi-
cated an interest in proposing a plan of reorganization.8 Although Nolan helped
to bring Schiavone's interest to the attention of the trustee and the creditors
committee, at the suggestion of the district court judge he promptly disassociated
himself from consideration of any of the proposed reorganization plans. With
the consent of the district court judge and all interested parties, however, Nolan
continued to serve as counsel to the trustee, but limited his participation to
advising on the day-to-day management of the estate. Schiavone retained out-
side counsel to represent it in the reorganization.
3. In re Imperial "400" Nat'], Inc., 481 F.2d 41, 50 (3d Cir. 1973). See notes 85-93
infra and accompanying text.
4. Senior Judges Lumbard and Smith of the Second Circuit, and Senior Judge Aldrich
of the First Circuit. Judges Lumbard and Aldrich formerly were chief judges of their
respective circuits.
5. See also Union Bank v. Nolan, 94 S. Ct. 68 (1973) (denying certiorari in a related
proceeding).
6. 346 F. Supp. at 503. Nolan had been appointed with the approval of the district
court judge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 557 (1970) and General Order in Bankruptcy 44.
Regarding the requirements for appointing counsel to a trustee, see generally 2 W. Collier,
Bankruptcy IU 44.23 (14th ed. 1971).
7. See, e.g., In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 432 F.2d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 1970).
8. 346 F. Supp. at 503. Although the circuit council was under the impression that
Schiavone was a creditor of the estate in bankruptcy, it was later established that this
impression was erroneous. Brief for Appellant at 11-12, In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc.,
481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1973).
9. 346 F. Supp. at 504. Having conferred with Nolan regarding his connection with
Schiavone, the district court judge sent a letter to all interested parties informing them
that he had directed Nolan not to take any further part in the Schiavone proposed plan
and concluding: "'If it is felt by any interested party that this is not the appropriate way
to proceed to gain the financing of Schiavone Construction Co., the Court will entertain
and consider objections which, if any, should be promptly presented.'" Id. The court
received no objections. It did receive two letters-one each from the SEC and from
the creditor whose later criticisms provoked the council's resolution--endorsing the
court's suggestion with the proviso that Nolan not participate in the consideration of any
plan of reorganization. Id.
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Meanwhile, the friction between Nolan and the dissatisfied creditor had
escalated into a vitriolic vendetta.10 Although Nolan had been required to
return a portion of his interim allowance, the district court ruled that he was
not required to pay interest thereon." Appealing this ruling in early 1972, the
creditor wrote a letter to the court urging that it exercise its equity powers to
remove the trustee and Nolan.12 Since no formal motion had been filed, this
matter was not adjudicated. However, two of the members of the court who had
heard other appeals in the reorganization expressed concern to the chief judge
of the Third Circuit over the possible "appearance of impropriety to laymen"
occasioned by Nolan's continued representation of the trustee.'3 Because Nolan's
firm still represented Schiavone in other matters, and because of the bitter
litigation over fees, they recommended that it be suggested to the district judge
that Nolan resign as counsel. 4
In February, 1972, the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit met to consider
the matter and after some discussion enacted the following resolution:
RESOLVED that in all bankruptcy proceedings this Council holds as incompatible
the continued representation as attorney for the trustee by any lawyer or his firm
who represents a third party who submits a plan for reorganization in the bankruptcy;
and that the recusal by the attorney only from commenting on proposed reorganiza-
tion plans is not an adequate immunization from the appearance of a conflict of
interest.' 5
The substance of this resolution was communicated to the supervising district
court judge together with the suggestion that Nolan be given the opportunity to
resign.' 6 Responding that Nolan declined to resign because he believed that it
would be a "tacit concession of wrongdoing,"' 7 the district court opined that
10. 481 F.2d at 43-44.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 44. The circuit court required Nolan to pay interest on the returned interim
allowance. 456 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1972).
13. Letter from Circuit Judges Van Dusen and Adams to Chief Judge Seitz, Jan. 31,
1972, in Petitioner's Supplemental Brief and Appendix at 10a-12a, Nolan v. Judicial
Council of the Third Circuit, 409 U.S. 822 (1972).
14. Id. The letter continued: "Even though counsel for the trustee has disqualified
himself from acting on the plans, he continues to advise the trustee on a regular basis
in other matters and the trustee is favoring the last plan filed, submitted by one of the
best clients (Schiavone Co.) of his counsel's law firm, even though a plan favored by
many of the creditors had been submitted many months before the Schiavone plan and
gives them cash, which is what they want. We believe that the public will not under-
stand how the court permits Mir. Nolan to act as counsel for the trustee in any matters
under these circumstances, particularly in view of the litigation over fees and interest on
such fees involved in the various appeals to this court." Id. Reviening this letter, the
court of appeals characterized it as factually inaccurate and incomplete. 481 F.2d at 47.
15. 346 F. Supp. at 501.
16. Letter from Chief Judge Seitz to Judge Shaw, Mar. 10, 1972, in 346 F. Supp. at
514.
17. Letter from Judge Shaw to Chief Judge Seitz, Mar. 22, 1972, in Petitioner's
Motion, supra note 2, at 55a.
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were Nolan directed to resign, fundamental fairness would require that he be
afforded an evidentiary hearing.' 8
After discussing this letter at a subsequent council meeting, the chief judge,
quoting the original resolution, emphasized "that [the council's] resolution is
directed at the appearance of a conflict of interest. Consequently, it does not
view Mr. Nolan's case as presenting any issue of removal 'for cause' in the
sense of any alleged personal wrongdoing. . . .We are talking policy. 'n 9 For
this reason, the council asserted, no evidentiary hearing was necessary. Shortly
after learning of this decision, the district court signed an order removing Nolan
as counsel to the trustee. 20 Arguing that due process had been violated, Nolan
sought judicial review of the removal order and the underlying resolution. How-
ever, "[n]o statute, no rule and no decision [provided] any procedure for such
review. 212
Composed of the active circuit judges of the circuit who meet at least twice
a year,22 the judicial council of each circuit is the instrumentality charged with
the maintenance of administrative efficiency and public confidence in the fed-
eral court system.23 The councils were created by the Administrative Office Act
of 1939,24 because it had become apparent during the 1930s that some admin-
18. Id. at 58a. Judge Shaw commented: "It is my opinion that with an unblemished
career behind him, he has a right to a hearing which will afford him the opportunity to
dispell [sic] any cloud which would be cast upon his reputation by resignation sub-
mitted under pressure." Id. Although Judge Shaw conceded that there was no statutory
requirement for such hearing, he noted that 11 U.S.C.A. § 11(a)(17) provided for a
hearing in the event of the removal of a trustee and suggested that the instant circum-
stances required no less. Id. at 60a.
19. Letter from Chief Judge Seitz to Judge Shaw, Apr. 14, 1972, in Petitioner's
Motion at 54a.
20. See note 2 supra. At a subsequent hearing, Judge Shaw made clear that he had
entered this order only at the insistence of the judicial council. In re Imperial "400" Nat'l,
Inc., No. B-656-65 (D.N.J., Transcript of Hearing held May 11, 1972), in Petitioner's Mo-
tion at 42a.
21. Petitioner's Motion at 21.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1970).
23. See generally Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 95-111
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Judicial Conference of the United States, Report on the
Powers and Responsibilities of the Judicial Councils, H.R. Doc. No. 201, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Doc. No. 2011; Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty
Hinges of Federal Judicial Administration, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203 (1970).
24. Act of Aug. 7, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat. 1223. Section 306 of the Act
provided in pertinent part: "To the end that the work of the district courts shall be effec-
tively and expeditiously transacted, it shall be the duty of the senior circuit judge of each
circuit to call at such time and place as he shall designate, but at least twice in each year,
a council composed of the circuit judges for such circuit, who are hereby designated a
council for that purpose .... The senior judge shall submit to the council the quarterly
reports of the Director required to be filed by the provisions of section 304, clause (2),
[now 28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(2) (1970)] and such action shall be taken thereon by the council as
may be necessary. It shall be the duty of the district judges promptly to carry out the
directions of the council as to the administration of the business of their respective courts."
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istrative control over the federal courts was necessary.2 Public concern had
been aroused concerning certain judicial abuses-particularly court congestion. -
However, as Chief Judge Groner noted:
Under the present judicial set-up we have no authority to require a district judge to
speed up his work or to admonish him that he is not bearing the full and fair burden
that he is expected to bear, or to take action as to any other matter which is the
subject of criticism ...for which he may be responsible. 7,
The imposition of administrative control upon a federal judge, accustomed to
being "lord of all he surveyed," 28 was viewed by many as a threat to judicial
independence. A far more serious threat to judicial independence was the vest-
ing of administrative control over the judiciary in the executive branch.P This
was seen as a very real threat in 1937 owing to President Roosevelt's court-
packing efforts.30 As a matter of self-preservation, the notion that the judiciary
should "dean [its] own house"31 gained support. Accordingly, a primary objec-
tive of the Act was to remove every vestige of administrative and budgetary
control over the courts from the executive branch while authorizing the judiciary
itself to take whatever steps were necessary to eliminate abuses.3 2
The Act created the Administrative Office of the United States Courts13
primarily to assemble data regarding the functioning of the courts so that ad-
ministrative problems could be brought to the attention of the judiciary.34 An
early version of the Act proposed that the actual supervisory control over the
courts be centralized in the Supreme Court.3 5 At the suggestion of the then
Chief Justice,'1 this proposal was rejected by Congress in favor of decentraliza-
25. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 188 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1939).
26. Id. at 11.
27. Id.
28. Lumbard, The Place of the Federal Judicial Councils in the Administration of the
Courts, 47 A.BA.J. 169, 170 (1961).
29. Hearings on the Independence of Federal Judges Before the Subcomm. on Separa-
tion of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sss. 294 (1970)
(statement of Peter G. Fish).
30. Id. at 304, 372.
31. Hearings on S. 188, supra note 25, at 9.
32. See id. at 8-9. In the words of Judge Groner, the Act would "provide a method,
a legitimate, valid, legal method, by which, if necessary, and when necessary, the courts
may clean their own house ... [and would] give a body, in which the authority is firmly
lodged, the power to do that and to do it expeditiously." Hearings on H.RL 5999 Before
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1939).
33. Act of Aug. 7, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, § 302, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified at 28 US.C.
§ 601 (1970)).
34. Id. § 304 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 604 (1970)).
35. See H.R. Doc. No. 201, at 2-3.
36. Address of Chief Justice Hughes to the Judicial Conference of the United States,




tion.3 7 There were thought to be numerous advantages to vesting supervisory
control at the circuit level:
The circuit judges know the work of the district judges by their records that they
are constantly examining, while the Supreme Court gets only an occasional one. And
the circuit judges know the judges personally in their districts; they know their
capacities. And if complaints are made, they have immediate resort to the means of
ascertaining their validity.38
In accord with this theory of decentralization, the Act created the judicial coun-
cils of the circuits and vested in them actual supervisory authority over the
courts and their officers.
It was the intention of Congress "to charge the judicial councils of the cir-
cuits with the responsibility for doing all and whatever was necessary of an
administrative character to maintain efficiency and public confidence in the
administration of justice."39 The statutory language, characterized by one
judge as "about as broad as it could possibly be," 40 reflected this intention. A
council was authorized to "make all necessary orders for the effective and ex-
peditious administration of the business of the courts withiV its circuit." 41
Together with various other statutes42 which charge the councils with certain
specific responsibilities, this broad grant of power vests a council with far-
reaching authority. A report of the Judicial Conference in 1961 concluded:
The responsibility of the councils "for the effective and expeditious administration of
the business of the courts within its circuit" extends not merely to the business of
the courts in its technical sense (judicial administration), such as the handling and
dispatching of cases, but also to the business of the judiciary in its institutional sense
37. H.R. Doc. No. 201, at 3. Reviewing the historical background of § 332, the Re-
port emphasized: "Congress enacted the section dealing with judicial councils precisely as
the committee [of the Judicial Conference of 19381 had formulated it. It thus gave to
the judiciary, in exact form and content, what the Committee of the Conference, under
the responsibility imposed upon it by the Conference, was convinced . . . embodied the
responsibility and had the capacity to function as an effective instrumentality In the cor-
related scheme being enacted, for 'The Administration of the United States Courts.'" Id.
at 4.
38. Address of Chief Justice Hughes to the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Sept. 30, 1938, as quoted in H.R. Doc. No. 201, at 3.
39. Celler, Foreword to H.R. Doc. No. 201, at v.
40. Lumbard, The Place of the Federal Judicial Councils in the Administration of the
Courts, 47 A.BA.J. 169 (1961).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1970) ; see note 1 supra.
42. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 134(c) (1970) (directing a district judge to reside near his court);
28 U.S.C. § 137 (1970) (dividing the business of the district court among the district judges
if those judges are unable to agree among themselves); 28 U.S.C. § 140(a) (1970) (con-
senting to the pretermination of a district court session); 28 U.S.C. § 142 (1970) (ap-
proving the court quarters of the district court); 28 U.S.C. § 294(c) (1970) (assigning
retired judges to duties within the circuit); 28 U.S.C. § 295 (1970) (consenting to the
assignment of judges from outside the circuit); 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (1970) (certifying to
the President the disability of a judge who is eligible to retire); 28 U.S.C. § 457 (1970)
(designating the place where court records shall be stored).
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(administration of justice), such as the avoiding of any stigma, disrepute, or other
element of loss of public esteem and confidence in respect to the court system, from
the actions of a judge or other person attached to the courts.43
Despite the fact that the district court judges are statutorily required to
carry into effect the orders of a council, 44 the councils have no explicit statutory
authority to enforce their orders. Although various authorities have speculated
on measures which a council theoretically might invoke against a recalcitrant
judge,45 the rationale underlying this "lack of teeth" may well have been that:
[a]s members of a professional guild, with its own process of socialization and with
its own recognized standards of conduct and ways of doing things, judges accepted
as legitimate those actions resting on acceptable premises. With such individuals, un-
abashed exercises of administrative power were not only unacceptable, but, hope-
fully, unnecessary. Confidence in voluntary compliance was widely expressed at the
time of the council's establishment. 46
Regarding themselves as senior advisors rather than as policemen, the councils
preferred to implement the findings of the Administrative Office by personal,
informal overtures to particular judges rather than by edict.47 "Orders" were
rarely issued and seldom reported.4 s "Formal action by the judicial council,"
one chief judge admonished, "should be the last resort and only after it has be-
come quite clear that other means have failed."4 9
This informal modus operandi and reliance on the socialized compliance of
district court judges, while consistent with the council's lack of enforcement
power, obfuscated a basic deficiency in the administrative scheme-the lack of
an orderly process for review of council actions. Although there is nothing in
43. H.R. Doc. No. 201, at 8-9.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1970) ; see note I supra.
45. See, e.g., Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial Administration,
37 U. ChLi. L. Rev. 203, 230 (1970). It has been suggested that a council might punish a
problem judge "by temporarily assigning him to 'a nonexistent place' where court was
never held or to a place of court where little judicial business was generated." Id. Other
possibilities suggested include the threat of a certification of disability pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 372(b) (1970); the removal of cases assigned to the judge (see notes 53-65 infra and
accompanying text); and the institution of an action in the nature of mandamus. Fish,
supra, at 230-33.
46. The Independence of Federal Judges, supra note 29, at 295 (statement of Peter G.
Fish). Although the advocates of § 332 thought that the instances of non-compliance with
the council's orders would be so rare that they need not be considered, it was believed that
in such an instance the council would have adequate power. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 188,
supra note 25, at 18-19. Concurring that the instances of a council's order being dis-
regarded would be rare, Chief Judge Bailey Aldrich expressed a contrary view as to the
ultimate result: "I think if a district judge tells us to go to hell, he tells us to go to bell."
The Independence of Federal Judges, supra note 29, at 366.
47. H.R. Doc. No. 201, at 9.
48. Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial Administration, 37 U.
ChLi. L  Rev. 203, 230 (1970).
49. Lumbard, The Place of the Federal Judicial Councils in the Administration of the
Courts, 47 A.BAJ. 169, 171 (1961).
1973]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the legislative history of section 332 to suggest that Congress intended the
councils to be entirely free from scrutiny,5 0 the lack of a review procedure was
not thought vital-possibly because it was believed "[t]hat the council[s]
[would] be restrained by the inherent limitations of the situation. They would
know that if they commanded a judge to do something, unnecessarily or un-
wisely, he would refuse to do it, and that would probably be the end of the
matter."51 The restraint displayed by the councils caused them to be criticized
severely as ineffectual.5 2 Partly as a result of this self-restraint, however, there
were no reported cases in which the propriety of a council's order was chal-
lenged. Thus, for the first twenty-five years of the councils' existence, the estab-
lishment of a formal procedure for judicial review was academic.
Beginning in 1964, however, Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth
Circuit,53 raised-but did not settle-important jurisdictional and procedural
questions regarding judicial review of council action.
In Chandler, a continuing controversy between the Circuit Council of the
Tenth Circuit and Chief Judge Chandler of the Western District of Oklahoma
culminated in the council's issuing a three-pronged order directing Chandler to
take no further action in any cases pending before him, assigning those cases to
other judges, and prohibiting the assignment to him of any new cases. 4 This
order was interlocutory pending further hearings. 5 When Chief Judge Chandler
asserted his right to continue to hear the cases then before him, the order was
modified to that effect.56 Although the council invited Judge Chandler and the
other district court judges to attend a hearing, Judge Chandler indicated by
letter that the order as modified was agreeable to him and to the other district
judges. For this reason no hearing was held.57
In July, 1967, noting that Judge Chandler had only twelve cases left on his
docket, the council asked the district judges to consider anew a division of his
50. Cf. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 108-09 (1970)
(see note 74 infra). But cf. The Independence of Federal Judges, supra note 29, at 1051
(memorandum of Arthur S. Miller). Writing prior to the decision in Chandler, Professor
Miller opined: "The councils act as autonomous units within each circuit; they are respon-
sible to no one and, from all appearances, their decisions may not be subject to review." Id.
51. Hearings on H.R. 5999, supra note 32, at 22.
52. See, e.g., Staff of Senate Appropriations Comm., 86th Cong., 2d Sess., Field Study
of the Operations of United States Courts 84 (Comm. Print 1959) (popularly known as
The Cotter Report).
53. 398 U.S. 74 (1970). Chandler occasioned wide comment because of its implications
as an alternative to impeachment. See Comment, Removal of Federal Judges-New Alterna-
tive to an Old Problem: Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 13 U.C.L.A.L.
Rev. 1385 (1966); Note, Removal of Federal Judges-Alternatives to Impeachment, 20
Vand. L. Rev. 723 (1967); 51 B.U.L. Rev. 106 (1971).
54. 398 U.S. at 78.
55. On Jan. 6, 1966, Chandler sought a stay of the council's order in the Supreme Court.
The stay was denied on the ground that the order was "entirely interlocutory in character
pending prompt further proceedings .... " 382 U.S. 1003 (1966).
56. 398 U.S. at 79-80.
57. Id. at 80.
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caseload. Judge Chandler and the other judges responded that "the [modified]
order for the division of business in this district [was] agreeable under the
circumstances."58 Maintaining that this letter of acquiescence had been merely
a strategic move to prevent the council from invoking its powers under 28
U.S.C. § 137,59 Judge Chandler filed a petition for a writ of prohibition and/or
mandamus in the Supreme Court ° on the grounds that the council had usurped
the impeachment power and had unconstitutionally stripped him of his judicial
function.61
The Court noted that the case presented questions of the first impression," -
but it avoided both the ultimate question-whether the council's action had
been beyond "the line defining the maximum permissible intervention con-
sistent with the constitutional requirement of judicial independence"63-and
the threshold question-whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review
the council's actions. Pointing to Judge Chandler's acquiescence in the council's
modified order, and his failure to seek relief "from either the Council or some
other tribunal,"6 4 the Court held:
Whether the Council's action was administrative action not reviewable in this Court,
or whether it is reviewable here, plainly petitioner has not made a case for the ex-
traordinary relief of mandamus or prohibition.65
Although the holding provided no answers to the questions posed, the opinion
contained interesting dicta. The Court suggested that Congress had intended
the councils to function as administrative bodies--" 'board[s] of directors' for
the circuit'---and had not intended to and did not vest in them traditional judi-
cial powers. 66 The Court noted that "the action of the Judicial Council here
complained of has few of the characteristics of traditional judicial action and
much of what we think of as administrative action."0 T While not deciding
whether the actions of the council were subject to review, the Court strongly
intimated that it was unnecessary, and perhaps constitutionally impermissible
for the Supreme Court to exercise such review.0 8 While it did not endorse any
58. Id. at 82.
59. Id. at 86-87. 28 U.S.C. § 137 (1970) provides in part: "If the district judges in any
district are unable to agree upon the adoption of rules or orders for that purpose [of
dividing and assigning cases] the judicial council of the circuit shall make the necessary
orders."
60. 398 U.S. at 79.
61. Id. at 82.
62. Id. at 75.
63. Id. at 84.
64. Id. at 87.
65. Id. at 89.
66. Id. at 86 n.7.
67. Id. at 88 n.1O.
68. Id. at 86. The Court noted: "The authority of this Court to issue a writ of pro-
hibition or mandamus 'can be constitutionally exercised only insofar as such writs are in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.' If the challenged action of the Judicial Council was a
judicial act or decision by a judicial tribunal, then perhaps it could be reviewed by this
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procedure, the Court suggested at least two other possibilities-petitioning the
council itself for review, 9 or instituting a mandamus action in a district court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361.70 In any event, the Court conceded that:
Standing alone, § 332 is not a model of clarity in terms of the scope of the judicial
councils' powers or the procedures to give effect to the final sentence of § 332. Leg-
islative clarification of enforcement provisions of this statute and definition of review
of Council orders are called for.71
Although concurring in the denial of the extraordinary remedies of mandamus
or prohibition 7 2 Mr. Justice Harlan flatly contradicted the majority's implica-
tion that the actions of a judicial council were administrative rather than judi-
cial. While he conceded that "Congress . . . has not spoken, one way or the
other, regarding review of the orders of Judicial Councils, '73 Justice Harlan
nonetheless assumed that such review was possible.7 4 Pointing to the legislative
history of section 332, he argued that it was clearly the intention of Congress
to place the responsibility for administering the courts in the judiciary.75 "[ T ]he
Council's orders for the handling of cases in the district court serve as one step
in the progress of those cases toward judgment. Those orders can be expected
to apply commonly accepted notions of proper judicial administration to the
special factual situations of particular cases or particular judges.1 70 Justice
Harlan was of the opinion that the non-judicial powers vested in the councils 77
were not inconsistent with "a conclusion that the Council, when performing
its central responsibilities under 28 U.S.C. § 332, exercises judicial power
granted under Article III. ' 78 Since the councils could be characterized as judi-
Court without doing violence to the constitutional requirement that such review be ap-
pellate .... [A] conclusion that we do have appellate jurisdiction in this case would be no
mean feat." Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 87.
70. Id. n.8. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970) provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of
the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." Presum-
ably the mandamus action in the district court would lie only if the council were "admin-
istrative" rather than "judicial." 398 U.S. at 87 n.8.
71. 398 U.S. at 85 n.6.
72. Id. at 118. justice Harlan believed that "[slerious questions would be presented If,
after exhausting much of his pending business, Judge Chandler had sought additional busi-
ness and the Council had declined without advancing substantial additional justification for
the refusal. However, because of Judge Chandler's inaction, that situation is not presented
on this record." Id. at 126.
73. Id. at 112.
74. Id. at 108-09. "Their [the councils'] discretion in this matter, while broad, does not
seem to be of a different order from that possessed by district judges with respect to
many matters of trial administration. In both instances, review can correct legal error or
abuse of discretion where it occurs; that the scope of review will often be very narrow
does not in itself establish that the exercise of such discretion is a nonjudicial act." Id.
75. Id. at 107-08.
76. Id. at 108.
77. See note 42 supra.
78. 398 U.S. at 110.
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cial rather than administrative, review of their actions by the Supreme Court
would be an exercise of appellate rather than constitutionally impermissible
original jurisdiction. Justice Harlan found statutory authority for such jurisdic-
tion in the All Writs Act.79
The All Writs Act had been construed to empower the Supreme Court to
issue an extraordinary writ to a lower federal court in a case falling within its
statutory appellate jurisdiction where the issuance of the writ would further the
exercise of that jurisdiction.80 For the writ to issue it was not necessary that
the case be before the Supreme Court. A writ could issue if the "lower court's
action might defeat or frustrate this Court's eventual jurisdiction, even where
that jurisdiction could be invoked on the merits only after proceedings in an
intermediate court."8' Noting that by removing Judge Chandler the council had
affected hundreds of cases over which the Court had eventual appellate juris-
diction, and that the effect of his removal on those cases could not adequately
be remedied by appellate review,8 2 Justice Harlan concluded:
[T]he actions challenged by Judge Chandler sufficiently affect matters within this
Court's appellate jurisdiction to bring his application for an extraordinary writ within
our authority under § 1651 (a), and that his charges, if sustained, would present an
appropriate occasion for the issuance of such a writ.8s
Against this background and with only Chandler for guidance, Nolan was
uncertain how to proceed:
Petitioner in this case does not know whether he is required to seek relief in the
Court of Appeals which has already denied his right to a hearing, or before the
Judicial Council, which is unlikely to reverse its own decision, or before the senior
circuit judges of the Third Circuit who have at least an "appearance" of a conflict of
interest and, seemingly, much more, or by engaging in the seeming futility of a
separate suit in the United States District Court seeking a determination that its
superior judges who compose the Judicial Council are wrong, or by making an orig-
inal application to the United States Supreme Court.8 4
In an effort to resolve this dilemma, Nolan pursued several avenues. On May 2,
1972, the same day that the order removing him as counsel to the trustee was
signed, he filed an action in the nature of mandamus in the district court;85 on
May 24, he filed a motion for leave to file a petition and a petition for writ of
prohibition and/or mandamus in the Supreme Court;8 0 and on May 31, he
79. Id. at 117. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970) provides: "The Supreme Court and all
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
80. 398 U.S. at 112 (Harlan, J., concurring in denial of writ).
81. Id. (emphasis in original).
82. Id. at 113.
83. Id. at 117. Justice Harlan acknowledged that this was an expansive interpretation of
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) which had no direct precedent; however, he stated, "it seems to me
wholly in line with the history of that statute and consistent with the manner in which it
has been interpreted both here and in the lower courts." Id. at 113.
84. Petitioner's Motion, supra note 2, at 21-22.
85. See 346 F. Supp. 500 (D.NJ. 1972) (dismissing mandamus application).
86. Nolan v. judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 409 U.S. 822 (1972).
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appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit from the removal order
of May 2, 1972.87
The motion to file a petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus was
denied without opinion.88 Although the district court took upon itself the task
of assembling a record, it dismissed the complaint on the dual grounds that
Nolan had an adequate remedy by way of appeal from the removal order, and
that a declaratory judgment action could not be substituted for an appeal.80
Nolan's appeal from this decision was consolidated with his original appeal0
and came on for hearing before a panel of senior judges from other circuits
sitting by designationY1
The panel saw no real issue on the question of whether it had jurisdiction to
hear the appeal from the removal order. Noting that the council had taken the
position in the mandamus proceeding that it would have such jurisdiction,"2
the panel held:
We are not reviewing the action of the Court of Appeals, but, directly, of the district
court. Admittedly we are reviewing indirectly the action of the Council ....
The circuit council, while composed of judges, is an administrative body, and not a
court. Reviewing the district court's May 2 order, which drew its substance from
the Council's resolution, seems in no material respect different from reviewing a
similar district court order which drew its substance from statutory provisions such
as 11 U.S.C. §§ 557, 558. The latter task is our statutory duty under 11 U.S.C.
§ 47. At least in a situation where there is a district court order capable of being
reviewed, we see no reason, in the absence of any statutory provision, why the Coun-
cil's actions are untouchable except by the Supreme Court .... "03
87. See 481 F.2d 41. Nolan was granted an interim stay of the removal order which was
vacated after hearing. See 346 F. Supp. at 507. The order vacating the stay was affirmed by
a panel of senior judges of the Third Circuit, see id., and by the Supreme Court, 406 U.S.
956 (1972).
88. 409 U.S. 822 (1972).
89. 346 F. Supp. at 512.
90. See note 87 supra.
91. See note 4 supra. Although Nolan had moved to disqualify the judges of the Third
Circuit, 346 F. Supp. at 507, that motion was never formally decided. Brief for Appellant at
13, In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1973). The judges of the Third
Circuit, however, recused themselves, and the appeal was heard before a panel of senior
judges from other circuits presumably designated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (1970).
This section provides in pertinent part: "The Chief Justice of the United States shall main-
tain a roster of retired judges of the United States who are willing and able to under-
take special judicial duties from time to time outside their own circuit .... Any such
retired judge of the United States may be designated and assigned by the Chief Justice to
perform such judicial duties as he is willing and able to undertake in a court outside his
own circuit . . . . Such designation and assignment to a court of appeals or district court
shall be made upon the presentation of a certificate of necessity by the chief judge or
circuit justice of the circuit wherein the need arises , . . ." Id. A judge sitting by designation
has "all the powers of a judge of the court, circuit or district to which he is designated and
assigned . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 296 (1970).
92. 481 F.2d at 42.
93. Id. (citation omitted). 11 U.S.C. § 47 (1970) to which the court analogized provides In
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Well aware that the Supreme Court had declined to permit the filing of a peti-
tion for mandamus or prohibition,94 the panel undercut the other possible ave-
nues of review, by affirming the dismissal of the district court mandamus ac-
tion,9 5 and by terming "unrealistic" a petition for rehearing to the council
itself.96
Having assumed jurisdiction, the panel thoroughly reviewed the case and
found that "summary action by the Council was manifestly unnecessary."9"
While it agreed that the matter of conflict of interests was properly within the
council's purview, the panel was disturbed by the fact that the council had
acted on the basis of information that was both "inaccurate and incomplete,"38
and by the feeling that the council's action too closely resembled a traditional
judicial function. Suggesting that a more appropriate procedure would have
been for the council to request a district court to hold a hearing on the issue of
Nolan's continued service,09 the panel remanded the case to the district court
for a hearing on whether Nolan should be reinstated as counsel.10°
judge Lumbard dissented on the ground that the council's order -was binding
on the district court, 10' and attacked the assumption of jurisdiction by the
majority:
It would be altogether incongruous for any lower court or single panel of judges in
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to pass upon whether what the council has
done is a lawful and proper exercise of the council's powers. There is no statutory
authority or precedent for such review.' 02
Stating that the only options open to Nolan were to petition the council for a
pertinent part: "(a) The United States courts of appeals . . .are invested with appellate
jurisdiction from the several courts of bankruptcy in their respective jurisdictions in pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy, either interlocutory or final, and in controversies arising in pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy, to review, affirm, revise, or reverse, both in matters of law and in
matters of fact .... (b) Such appellate jurisdiction shall be exercised by appeal and in
the form and manner of an appeal."
94. 481 F.2d at 42.
95. Id. at 42, 49.
96. Id. at 48 n.12. "The dissent's suggestion that Nolan might have asked for recon-
sideration by the Council, we regard as unrealistic. It is true that he could have asked. In
the light, however, of the detailed response, ante, to Judge Shaw's letter protesting Nolan's
removal without a hearing, we cannot think that a further request, however put, would
have been productive." Id.
97. Id. at 47.
98. Id.; see note 14 supra.
99. 481 F.2d at 49. The court also mentioned the possibility of the council's conducting
a hearing. There was precedent for this in the Third Circuit which held a hearing in 1950
concerning the refusal of a court reporter to make his financial records available to the
Administrative Office. In re Rodebaugh, 10 F.R.D. 207 (3d Cir. 1950). There vwas also
precedent in Chandler where the council planned, but did not hold a hearing. See text at
note 57 supra.
100. 481 F.2d at 49.
101. Id. at 50.
102. Id. (dissenting opinion).
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rehearing or the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition or mandamus,103
Judge Lumbard argued that the judges of the Third Circuit should have heard
the appeal en banc. "Thus the same judges making the order tinder attack would
have heard the appeal. . . The judges would be sitting in a dual capacity-
as a court of appeals . . . and as the circuit council.'1 0 4
In Judge Lumbard's view, the council was in the best position to determine
what measures should be taken with regard to Nolan so that public confidence
in the judicial system should be maintained.1'0 For this reason he urged that
the majority decision not be followed in other circuits:
Nothing could be more destructive of supervisory authority than to have cases such
as this passed upon by circuit judges from another circuit. Subject only to corrective
action by the Supreme Court, circuit council action should be followed by speedy
compliance, as the statute contemplates; it should not be permitted to spawn litiga-
tion and delay beyond what the circuit council may determine to allow.100
Notwithstanding Judge Lumbard's admonition, it is submitted that the Nolan
court judiciously resolved a difficult jurisdictional problem. Although there is
no evidence that council determinations should be immune from review,' 07 the
problem remained that no tribunal possessed prima facie authority to review
them. Justice Harlan had recognized this oversight in Chandler, and attempted
to cure it by vesting jurisdiction for review in the Supreme Court. 0 8 In that
Justice Harlan predicated Supreme Court jurisdiction upon his characterization
of the councils as judicial, he was arbitrary. Clearly, a council does not func-
tion judicially in the sense that it serves as an impartial umpire adjudicating
disputes between adversaries. Rather, a council is a protagonist. Its interest is
the administration of the business of the courts and, as demonstrated by Nolan,
this interest may at times conflict with the interest of an individual court officer
or judge. Furthermore, a council's operating procedure is non-judicial in that
it does not proceed by formal rules which would guarantee consideration of
only relevant material.1 9 As in Nolan, the council may operate ex parte on
the basis of factually unverified material.
On the other hand, an intrinsic aspect of the council is its judicial personality.
A primary purpose of the Administrative Office Act was to remove administra-
tive control over the courts from outsiders and vest it in the judiciary." 0
Moreover, to enforce its orders the council has relied upon voluntary compliance
induced by the respect traditionally accorded appellate decisions by lower court
judges."' However, while the respect accorded a circuit court has its roots in
103. Id.
104. Id. at 49 n.1.
105. Id. at 51.
106. Id. at 49-50 n.1.
107. See notes 50, 74 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 72-83 supra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
110. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
111. See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
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the careful, thorough, orderly process of appellate review, the respect given a
council is unrelated to the actual process by which a council's decisions are
reached. In other words, by operation of statute, the council has been accorded
the prestige and moral authority of the circuit court without the necessity of
adhering to the procedures which gave rise to that prestige.
In short, the council is a paradox-an institution with administrative pur-
poses and procedures which functions by virtue of judicial prestige. Justice
Harlan's characterization of the council as judicial was dearly a legal fiction
which ignored the unique character of the council in the interest of establishing
a basis for appellate review by the Supreme Court. A characterization of the
councils as administrative so that jurisdiction for review might be established
under the Administrative Procedures Act'12 is equally arbitrary and raises the
possibility that review would be vested in the district courts. At least two con-
siderations would render this awkward if not impractical. First, the council is
not an independent, co-equal branch of government, but is composed of circuit
judges to whom district court judges traditionally defer. Second, district court
judges are statutorily obligated to carry into effect the orders of the council.
The Nolan court avoided both of these pitfalls and established its jurisdic-
tion by analogy to 11 U.S.C. § 47113 on the ground that there was a district
court order subject to review by a circuit court. Although the court held that
the council was "an administrative body, and not a court"" 4 this characteriza-
tion was not offered as a basis for jurisdiction. Rather, it served to answer ob-
jections regarding hierarchical propriety, i.e. a circuit court reviewing a council
would not be reviewing the actions of another circuit court but of a distinct
body.
While vesting judicial review of a council's actions in the circuit court solved
many problems, the problem remained that the circuit court and the circuit
council were composed of the same individuals. As noted above, when the cir-
cuit judges sit as a council their primary concern is with the expedition of the
business of the courts. To do their duty, they must be active administrators.
Regardless of whether their sitting in judgment on their actions as an admin-
istrative council would violate 28 U.S.C. § 4 7 1sr or 28 U.S.C. § 455,110 as
112. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970). Section 702 provides: "A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." In the absence or in-
adequacy of a relevant statute, § 703 permits the maintenance of "any applicable form of
legal action, including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or manda-
tory injunction or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction."
113. See note 93 supra.
114. 481 F.2d at 42; see text at note 93 supra.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1970) provides: "No judge shall hear or determine an appeal from
the decision of a case or issue tried by him."
116. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) provides: "Any justice or judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is
or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or his at-




asserted by Nolan," 7 for them to do so clearly is inconsistent with commonly
accepted notions of judicial impartiality and non-involvement. This dilemma
was avoided in Nolan by the recusal of the judges of the Third Circuit and
the designation of judges from outside the circuit.118 Contrary to Judge
Lumbard's position,119 this solution has the advantages of assembling a tribunal
uniquely qualified to consider a conflict involving a circuit council while pre-
serving public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. A further practical
advantage is that the problem is resolved by judicial proceedings at the circuit
level, thus bringing the conflict back within the judicial mainstream and pro-
viding a record for eventual review by the Supreme Court. This approach is
entirely consistent with the decentralized spirit of administration by judicial
council. However, since 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) 120 conditions the assignment of
a judge from outside the circuit upon the presentation of a certificate of
necessity by the chief judge or circuit justice of the circuit, there is no require-
ment that a circuit council adhere to this precedent.
Given the pervasive authority of judicial councils (which is unlikely to be
diminished by either Congress121 or the courts122), a system of judicial review
of their actions is required to preserve due process and public confidence in the
judiciary. Nolan provides a pragmatic procedure for such review. Since a chief
judge is not required to request the assignment of judges from outside the
circuit, and since in every case there may not be an intervening district court
order to provide a judisdictional foundation, it would be desirable for Congress
to codify the procedure evolved in Nolan and thereby establish a uniform
statutory procedure.
J. Gregory Milinoe
117. Petitioner's Motion, supra note 2, at 29.
118. See note 91 supra.
119. See text at note 106 supra.
120. See note 91 supra.
121. Congress held extensive hearings on judicial administration including the functioning
of judicial councils in 1970. See The Independence of Federal Judges, supra note 29. As a
result of these hearings, 28 U.S.C. § 332 was amended to provide for a circuit executive who
would aid a council in its administrative functions. 28 U.S.C. § 332(e) (1970).
122. The court in Nolan, for example, dismissed the constitutional challenge to § 332
almost summarily: "It cannot be unconstitutional to authorize the courts to manage their
own business." 481 F.2d at 45.
